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House of Representatives

The House met at 9 a.m. and was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. KOLBE].

DESIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Speaker:

WASHINGTON, DC,
September 8, 1995.

I hereby designate the Honorable JIM KOLBE to act as Speaker pro tempore on this day.

NEWT GINGRICH,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

O gracious God, from whom we have received our very lives and in whom is our hope and confidence, we express our thanksgiving for this new day and the opportunities that are before us. We place before You our needs, those attitudes and feelings and hopes that are dear to us, asking that You would bless us so we choose the better way, confirm us in all truth, and forgive us in the depths of our hearts. May what we say and do and think this day be to Your glory and honor. In Your name, we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Will the gentleman from California [Mr.

CUNNINGHAM] come forward and lead the House in the Pledge of Allegiance.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM led the Pledge of Allegiance as follows:

I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

DISAPPROVING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to section 2908 of Public Law 101-510 and by direction of the Committee on National Security, I call up the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 102) disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

The text of House Joint Resolution 102 is as follows:

H.J. RES. 102

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on July 13, 1995.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2908 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEJEDA] will each be recognized for 1 hour.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE].

(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, today, the House will consider whether to disapprove the recommendations of the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to close 28 major military installations and realign the mission at another 77 bases. I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 102, which would disapprove the Commission's recommendations, and I urge my colleagues to oppose it as well.

We are currently in the fourth round of base closures since 1989, and the third and final round under the Commission's present charter. We all recognize that base closures are a reality in the post-cold-war world, particularly in view of the reductions in force structure that have taken place over the past 6 years.

The Department of Defense is counting on the savings resulting from base closure and realignment to fund currently underfunded modernization and infrastructure improvements late this decade and into the next century. According to the Commission, implementation of their recommendations would result in one-time costs of approximately \$3.6 billion. However, the Commission expects \$1.6 billion in annual savings and net present value savings of \$19.3 billion over the next 20 years to result from the 1995 base closure recommendations.

Personally, I am concerned about ongoing force structure reductions as well as the closing of a number of installations already in the works under BRAC. At least some of these bases are unique national assets that we will never reconstitute even if needed in the future.

A number of Members, including myself, have been skeptical when it comes to the rosy projections that have been made in previous base closure rounds concerning the savings that will accrue

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.



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to the military services. To date, savings have fallen well short of expectations while the up-front costs of closures have soared beyond initial estimates and remain underfunded. Reluctantly, however, I realize that with the growing pressures on defense resources we simply cannot afford to keep all the installations and facilities open that I believe our military may one day need again.

Speaking from experience, I understand the pain and dislocation that a base closure or major realignment can inflict on a community, even a region. In the past, even if I was not supportive of the closing of bases, I was at least satisfied that the Commission and the closure process had essentially worked as intended—that politics had not been the determining factor in the development of the administration's or the Commission's numerous recommendations.

In this sense, I was especially concerned about the administration's handling of the Commission's recommendations. There is no question that Presidential politics were paramount in the White House's very public and tortured consideration of the Commission's recommendations. The veneer of a national security justification for rejection of the list was dropped as politics quickly took center stage. Fortunately, common sense prevailed over politics and the administration ultimately backed down and allowed the process to proceed. For the sake of the process, I am nonetheless relieved that the President finally opted to allow substance and process to prevail over politics in his decision to submit the Commission's recommendations to the Congress.

However, I remain concerned about recent comments made by senior administration officials implying that the White House will find a way to assist a select few installations in politically sensitive States by "privatizing in place." Some have gone so far as to guarantee employment to workers at installations scheduled to be closed—a guarantee that everyone knows will be nearly impossible to honor.

While I am sympathetic to the desire to preserve defense skills and jobs, it is clear that the Commission was seriously concerned about the cost of maintaining excess capacity at several types of installations, particularly Air Force depots. Privatization of workloads at these particular installations was only one of several options recommended by the Commission. Contrary to the assertions of some, Congress ultimately will retain the authority to determine how and if privatization in place makes sense.

Mr. Speaker, the National Security Committee considered the recommendations of the Commission very carefully. While some Members expressed concern with individual recommendations contained in the Commission's report, the committee decided to support the Commission's find-

ings. The committee voted 43 to 10 to report House Joint Resolution 102 adversely. In the committee's judgment, this resolution should be defeated. I urge a "no" vote to my colleagues.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to divide my 1 hour of debate so the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO] is able to control 20 minutes of that time and I will control 40 minutes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEJEDA] will be recognized for 40 minutes, and the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO] will be recognized for 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEJEDA].

(Mr. TEJEDA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this resolution represents the end of a long and painful process for many communities and their citizens. While these communities are now turning their attention toward reuse efforts and planning for the future, we have this final opportunity to overturn the Base Closure Commission's recommendations.

In my opinion, the base Closure Commission made a mistake in voting to close two of the Air Force's air logistics centers. These depots are located in San Antonio, TX and Sacramento, CA. My colleagues from San Antonio and Sacramento will speak to this decision in a few minutes, so I will not add to that specific debate yet.

It should come as no surprise, then, that the San Antonio and Sacramento delegations introduced resolutions of disapproval. This issue is not a partisan issue. Base closures and economic losses cut across party lines. I stand here before the House because my constituents and my district, in fact this Nation, does not deserve the closure of Kelly Air Force Base. I do not believe that closure of Kelly Air Force Base is in the best interest of our national security. If there is a way to keep Kelly open, we will fight that fight, and this is what this resolution of disapproval is all about.

I expect nothing less from my colleagues across the Nation who also lose bases and jobs in this process. And we will hear from them. In contrast, I expect those whose districts stand to gain from these recommendations to voice their strong support for the Base Closure Commission's recommendations.

I have no illusions about the final outcome of this matter. It is the bottom of the ninth and we are behind by a lot of runs. But this does not mean we give up and walk off the field. There are important issues which need to be

addressed, and I look forward to a lively discussion during the next 2 hours.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Texas sharing his time with me, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the BRAC Commission's 1995 base closure list and in support of this resolution. I do so for the first time. While this is the fourth round of base closure, it is the first time that I have risen in opposition, despite the fact that it is the third of four rounds that have impacted the community, Sacramento, CA, that I represent along with several of my colleagues who will appear later today.

I want to join with the comments that my friend, Mr. TEJEDA, of San Antonio has made with reference to my particular opposition to the decision to close two of the five Air Logistics Centers under the Materiel Command based in Dayton, OH. I strongly supported the position that the Air Force and DOD took to downsize in place. I think that was the right decision, both in terms of keeping capacity available for any international emergency that would have required surge capability.

I regret the decision, which was very hard fought within the Commission, to close the two facilities that now will undergo privatization. As my friend from San Antonio said, we will hear a good deal from people who expected to gain a great deal from the closure of our two bases, who are troubled by the report of the DOD Commission on Roles and Missions which has advocated strongly the privatization of our heretofore public Air Force Logistics Centers.

I know what I am engaging in here today is probably under the rubric of a primal scream. I understand that I am probably engaging in a fruitless protest, and I have seen others whose bases have closed do so in prior discussions of resolutions to, in effect, reverse the decisions of the BRAC process of the Commission. But I think I have justification in using this last opportunity to express my measure of protest, because in fact nowhere in the United States has the BRAC had such a devastating impact as it has had in the Sacramento area.

In all four rounds of the BRAC, the Sacramento area has shouldered well over a quarter of all the jobs lost in California due to BRAC. In fact, the Sacramento area standing alone has absorbed more base closure losses in terms of direct and indirect jobs than any other State in the Nation. In fact, the same could be said of the Sacramento area as well as San Francisco Bay area individually.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 102 and I urge my colleagues to vote against it.

I supported the establishment of the current base closure process in 1990. I believed then, and I continue to believe, that the disposal of unneeded military infrastructure and overhead would save scarce resources. I think we have come a long way in that regard.

Frankly we have closed bases through this process that I never thought would ever be closed—and we have closed some that we may ultimately wish we had not. Personally, I was opposed to the closure in previous rounds of facilities such as Lowry Air Force Base and Pueblo Army Depot in Colorado. I fought to keep them from closing, but when faced with the decision to accept or reject the entire list produced by the Commission, I concluded that the Commission had acted appropriately, and that in an era of declining defense dollars the national interest had been served. This year I feel the same way, even though Fitzsimons Army Medical Center is on the list.

I want to briefly say a word about the ultimate reuse for facilities such as Fitzsimons. One of our goals throughout this process has been to get installations slated for closure as quickly as possible into reuse by the local community. I have been impressed with the speed and dedication with which the city of Aurora has approached redevelopment. Working with the University of Colorado, an impressive reuse plan is already taking shape for Fitzsimons. I want to encourage the Department of Defense, particularly the Department of the Army, to do what it can to facilitate a rapid transition of the facility and related property to the local redevelopment authority so that the people of Aurora and Colorado can benefit from reuse as soon as possible.

Mr. Speaker, since the first round of base closures in 1988, over 100 major U.S.-based facilities have closed, and plant replacement value has been reduced by 21 percent. The Commission's 1995 recommendations will raise the number of major U.S.-based installations closed to about 130, and plant replacement value will have been reduced by another 6 percent or so.

Although not covered by BRAC, unneeded overseas infrastructure has also been reduced substantially. During the BRAC period, the services have closed or reduced operations at over 950 bases overseas—a plant replacement value reduction of 43 percent.

Despite all the rhetoric from some quarters, including from some in the administration who periodically suggest that we have not done enough, I believe this process has resulted in a significant downsizing of our military infrastructure. In my judgment, the military services need to adjust to the sharp base and installation reductions they will have to absorb.

As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, I have been approached about

the possibility of authorizing another round of base closures in 6 years or so. Indeed, that was one of the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. There may be a need in the future to resurrect this process, but I believe that authorizing another round now would be a mistake.

The services need time to adjust to a post-BRAC environment. Some units have moved as many as three times throughout the final phases of BRAC. Once force structure and installations infrastructure have stabilized, and once we have a clear understanding of the actual costs and savings balance from BRAC, Congress will be in a better position to assess whether any further rounds of base closure are necessary. While I have great respect for the Commissioners, particularly Chairman Alan Dixon, I would not support authorization of a future round at this time.

There is no doubt that there are problems in the BRAC process. It is clear that the upfront costs of base closures and realignments have been substantially more than anyone expected. It is also true that revenues from disposal have not been realized, and realized savings have fallen far short of original estimates. This does not mean that the process has not worked or that it has collapsed. It is an indication of just how difficult the implementation of BRAC, with its huge upfront costs and hidden environmental cleanup costs, has proven to be in practice.

Mr. Speaker, the first hearing the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities held in this session concerned the BRAC process. I want to assure the House that the subcommittee will continue its commitment to oversight of BRAC implementation even after the formal Commission process ends this year.

The Secretary of Defense estimates that \$40 billion will be saved as a result of action taken in all four phases of base closure. He may be right. I hope he is; but even if savings fall short of expectations, there is no question that we must complete the process we began 7 years ago. I urge my colleagues to support the judgment of the National Security Committee and vote "no" on the resolution of disapproval.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Sacramento, CA [Mr. MATSUI], who has worked so long and hard to build McClellan Air Force Base into the modern entity it is today.

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Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO], but first of all, I would like to take a moment to first of all thank both the gentleman from California [Mr. DOOLITTLE] and the gentleman from California [Mr. POMBO]

for the hard work they did in trying to pursue our efforts to save McClellan Air Force Base. We had a very strong bipartisan effort in northern California and without their help, I do not believe we could have gotten as far as we did.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to spend a few moments to talk about my colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO], who is adjacent to me in Sacramento County. The gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO] and I have worked over the years to get \$400 million of construction programs for McClellan in the last decade and a half. This is because the Air Force has suggested that we should do this to maintain McClellan as a viable, strong base of the five maintenance depots.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman, over the last 8 or 9 months in particular, did a tremendous job in doing whatever he could to save McClellan Air Force Base. I think the final recommendation, that is the privatization of this base, would not have occurred without his able assistance and his ability to put together this package in a coalition.

So, Mr. Speaker, I say to the gentleman from California, on behalf of my constituents in the Fifth Congressional District, I want to thank him very much for his help, because I think we will be able to maintain a level of employment at that base now that will not create economic disruption. So I just want to pay my respects for the gentleman's efforts over the last 8 months to a year.

Mr. Speaker, I would also like to acknowledge the President's activities in this. As you know, the Air Force, the Pentagon, and the President did not want to close McClellan Air Force Base. He wanted to basically keep the five logistic depots open and downsize all five of them for the purpose of future possible national international crises.

Those are the five probably most important depots in the country. When these five depots are compared to the Army or the Navy, we always come out ahead, because we have become technologically the most proficient. Obviously, we have one of the best work forces in the entire Federal Government and, as a result of that, I believe the long-range plans of this administration, but particularly of the people that are running on a long-term basis the Pentagon, have felt if we ever went into interservicing, these bases should be the ones to preserve.

As my colleagues know, the President attempted to save these bases for that future possibility. Unfortunately, the Commission, in its own wisdom, decided to close two bases, one in Texas and the McClellan Air Force Base in California. This was against the strenuous objection of the administration, the Pentagon, and the Air Force.

I have to say that the reason I am going to vote in favor of this resolution, and against the recommendations

of this Commission, is because originally this process was to be nonpolitical. It was to be an objective process. We have had two prior closings and we had two bases in my district that closed as a result of those two prior Commissions. Mr. Speaker, I voted to close those bases, even though there was a total of 10,000 employees, because I thought the process was fair and objective.

But I have to tell my colleagues that this process was the most outrageous process around. Those Commissioners, not all of them, but many of them, had their own agenda. One who was a high-ranking Army official, for example, not only during his discussions showed significant bias, but he was actually outwardly favoring Army depots saying all his experience with the Army led him to believe that we should save these bases. That is not the way this process was supposed to work.

In fact the irony of all of this is when Sacramento Army Depot in my district closed, we were able to get the last Commission to allow certain functions to be bid out and McClellan was one of the bidders, along with Tobyhanna and some other Army bases. Believe it or not, McClellan Air Force Base was the one that actually prevailed over the Army bases to get an Army contract. Now that contract is going to be going to an Army base, even though they were less efficient.

So, Mr. Speaker, I am going to be voting for this resolution because I felt that the process was unfair.

Mr. Speaker, in conclusion I would like to make one further observation. To the employees of Sacramento County who over the years have just done a tremendous job, I want to thank them for their efforts on behalf of the national defense of this country. We are going to do everything we can to make sure this privatization plan that the President and the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO] put together will work.

And I want to make an admonition. I am going to be one of the strongest proponents of privatization of depots in the future. And if, in fact, we are able to pursue this and make progress in this area, it is my opinion that those bases that were protected for political reasons, not for substantive reasons, and some were protected for substantive reasons, but those that were protected for political reasons will find that they are the most in jeopardy as we go into the 21st century.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM].

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I am amazed, especially at my California colleagues. When they vote for a \$177 billion cut in defense, and California is the leader in the defense industry and most of our bases are in California, what did they expect? What did they expect?

They vote for a Clinton tax package and \$177 billion cut, after Colin Powell,

Dick Cheney, and then-candidate Clinton said that anything above a \$50 billion cut would put us into a hollow force. And then I hear that the President wanted to save California bases. Yes, California is important in a 1996 election. Sure, he would like to save them.

But I think we need to look at why we are closing those bases in the first place. Who called for an additional base closure round? The very same people now that are saying that the President wants to save those bases. Give me a break.

Mr. Speaker, in committee they used the analogy of a fisherman and they said take the analogy of a catfish that has now been cut and we are going to skin him alive, gut him, and eat him. Well, do not expect us to sit there and take it. If my colleagues voted for the defense cuts and they are from California, they are not the fish; they are the in the role of a fisherman. They caused the problem.

I take a look at what we have gone through and why many of us are fighting against the continued assaults on DOD spending. I look at the increase in nondefense spending by 261 percent by Members and, yes, even some of the Members on our own committee in this House.

I take a look at the extension of Somalia, which cost us billions of dollars, and Haiti, which has cost us billions of dollars, and what they want to do is delay this process. And right now, DOD is having to eat the overhead, because we have not funded BRAC.

Mr. Speaker, if families are from El Toro and they are have to move, or Miramar and having to move to Fallon, Nevada, NTC, all over the State of California, those families are being disrupted and they are losing their jobs, defense jobs with the military and associated jobs. We lost a million jobs in the State of California.

But as Paul Harvey said, the rest of the story is look at who caused it. And they say that the President wants to save those bases. Absolutely, he caused it.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, as I said in my comments, I supported the last two closings, including bases in my district. No one is suggesting the downsizing should not occur. It is the process that is extremely important in this particular effort.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I disagree.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Utah [Mr. HANSEN].

(Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to House Joint Resolution 102 and in support of the recommendations of the BRAC Commission.

I know BRAC is painful. The First District of Utah has lost a base in each round of BRAC and will lose Defense Depot Ogden if this list is accepted. While I may not agree with every decision, I believe the BRAC process is fair and must remain independent. That is why I will vote against this resolution.

Now, after the game has been fairly played, the President wants to go back and change the rules. Under Public Law 101-510, the President had two choices: Either send the list back to the Commission with recommended changes or accept the list in total. The President instead decided to play outside the law, and forward the list to Congress with two substantial changes.

The President's unprecedented direction to the Pentagon to privatize in place the majority of jobs at the McClellan and Kelly Air Logistics Centers is nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the independent BRAC process for the political expediency of satisfying northern California.

The administration has continued to play fast and loose with the law. On a recent visit to McClellan, White House Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta, issued the following threat:

If there is any action in Congress or by any other depots to try to inhibit the privatization effort, the President has made it clear that we will consider that a breach of process and he will order the McClellan be kept open.

I find that kind of blatant disregard for the law offensive and contemptuous of the law and of Congress. I want to be very clear, I do not consider the President's letter, directing privatization in place, to be part of the BRAC recommendations we will approve here today.

I also want to point out that any plan to do so would clearly violate at least five sections of title 10, United States Code. The President simply cannot ignore current law to solve his own political problems. Our country has found, several times in our history, that no one is above the law.

It appears the President has once again come up with a lose-lose-lose compromise by worrying about political repercussions instead of leading the Nation.

This plan to privatize inefficient excess capacity and guarantee jobs is bad for the Department of Defense because it does not address the fundamental excess capacity questions in the depot system and will only result in higher maintenance costs and substantially lower savings.

It is bad for the country because it undermines the integrity of a process designed to be free from this kind of political tampering.

And it is bad for many of the workers at McClellan and Kelly who will now lose the option to follow their Federal job to another DOD depot.

This recommendation ignores the BRAC Commission findings that "the closure of McClellan AFB, and the San Antonio Air Logistics Center, permits

significantly improved utilization of the remaining depots and reduces DOD operating costs." The closure was deemed a necessity given the significant amount of excess depot capacity and limited defense resources.

I have already joined with other Members of Congress to raise these objections to the Pentagon. It is obvious that all bases, would prefer a second chance to save the majority of the jobs through privatization in place. Support of this option for political expediency at McClellan, will endanger the entire BRAC process and the \$19 billion in savings it represents.

I urge all my colleagues to vote against this resolution and to join me in holding the President, and Department of Defense, accountable for compliance with the law of the land.

Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. HORN].

Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, the closure process is an attempt to be objective. By and large it has been objective. It is not a generally partisan process. However, it is an intense process within the services and between the services where there are very high partisan rivalries.

In the case of the Navy, it is a matter of the air wing versus the surface fleet versus the underseas fleet. What happened in the case of the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, the only shipyard that has ever returned, consistently, money to the Treasury; the most efficient one, if you listen to the former commander of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Captain Bowman, when he was on the 1993 Base Closure Commission. He said that everyone in the Navy knows that Long Beach has been 4 years ahead of every single yard, both in efficiency and effectiveness.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to put in the RECORD at this point various material to back up that and other statements.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, June 13, 1995.

Hon. ALAN J. DIXON,
*The Base Closure and Realignment Commission,
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425, Arlington, VA.*

DEAR CHAIRMAN DIXON: I am writing to address several issues which are crucial to the deliberations the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission will soon be undertaking concerning the potential closure of naval shipyards. As you are aware, The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510) and subsequent changes made by the Congress (Public Law 102-311 and Public Law 102-484) were designed to provide a fair and impartial process for the timely closure and realignment of domestic military installations. Under the provisions of this legislation, specific criteria were established under which the Department of Defense recommends a military installation for closure. The law specifically states that these recommendations must be based on the future force structure plan and preestablished final selection criteria.

Public Law 101-510 specifically states that the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission can make changes in the rec-

ommendations made by the Department of Defense only if the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the future force-structure plan and final selection criteria. (See Attachment A, Sec. 2903(d)(2)(B) and (C) of Public Law 101-510.)

It has been proven conclusively that in recommending Long Beach Naval Shipyard for closure, the Department of Defense substantially deviated from the future force structure plan and the preestablished final selection criteria. A summary of the evidence and rationale for this conclusion is presented in Attachment B.

If the Commission concludes that the Department of Defense substantially deviated from the criteria established in Public Law 101-510 then, under this law, this consideration, and this consideration alone, is sufficient grounds to change the Secretary of Defense's recommendation.

Representatives of the City of Long Beach and I have had several meetings with Commission staff where we have presented the arguments which prove that there has been substantial deviation. It is my belief that Commission staff is generally in agreement with our position. However, there seems to be a concern that since so much overcapacity exists, some closures will have to occur.

In this regard, the technical case to keep the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard open appears to rest heavily on nuclear issues, rather than on the future force structure plan and the preestablished final selection criteria. Based on the criteria established in Public Law 101-510, if overcapacity considerations argue for the closure of a naval shipyard, the data clearly favor keeping the Long Beach Naval Shipyard open. In addition, closing the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has a much greater effect on reducing excess capacity. Based on the data presented by Commission staff at the Commission "add" hearing on May 10, 1995, public naval shipyard nuclear excess capacity is currently 37 percent; conventional non nuclear excess capacity is 16 percent.

Closing conventional shipyards such as SRF Guam and the Long Beach Naval Shipyard does not change the Navy's excess capacity at nuclear shipyards. That remains untouched at its current level of 37 percent. However, this closure would result in a shortage of non nuclear shipyard capacity of minus 17 percent. The irony is that with the exception of a few aircraft carriers and submarines, the Navy's future ships will be conventionally powered. In brief, the future of the Navy seems to be non nuclear. Closing SRF Guam and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard would reduce nuclear excess capacity to 14 percent, and reduce non-nuclear excess capacity to 7 percent (See Attachment C, the bar charts prepared by Commission staff).

Thus, in terms of attaining the objective of reducing excess capacity, if one of these shipyards has to be closed, the numbers show that the Commission should close the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.

On another related but relevant issue, it is my understanding that a primary consideration in the decision not to close McClellan Air Force Base in 1993 was the cost of environmental clean-up. Moreover, the presentation made by community representatives at the Wednesday, May 24, 1995 regional hearing heavily emphasized the high cost of environmental restoration in the case to keep McClellan Air Force Base open.

As you are aware, legislation and the Department of Defense guidelines preclude consideration of the costs of environmental clean-up in the installation closure decision making process. However, if the potential environmental clean-up costs are used as a

justification not to close anyone particular installation, these criteria should be applied equally to all other installations being considered for closure.

I would like to make one final comment. It appears that many of the actions in defense of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard may have been driven by the upcoming New Hampshire Presidential Primary, as opposed to the criteria established by Public Law 101-510. A month before the base closure recommendations were made by the Secretary of Defense, President Clinton publicly stated that he did not believe the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard would be on the list of installations recommended by the Navy and the Department of Defense for closure. More recently, the President spoke over four New Hampshire radio stations as follows: "I support the Secretary of Defense's recommendations and I believe that they will be upheld."

The Navy sent its most senior officials to the Portsmouth site visit and regional hearing. Included were Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment Robert B. Pirie, Jr.; Chief of Naval Operations Jeremy M. Boorda; Director of Naval Reactors Admiral Bruce DeMars; and the Commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command, Vice Admiral George Sterner. This is unprecedented. Never in the history of the base closure process have such senior members of any military service attended a site visit and regional hearing for the express purpose of advocating that a particular installation remain open.

I am confident that the Commission will do all it can to assure that any decisions made regarding the closure of either the Portsmouth or the Long Beach Naval Shipyard will be fair and impartial—and made outside of the political arena—in accordance with the procedures established in Public Law 101-510. The injection of politics at the highest level is, I believe, unfortunate and has made more difficult the already considerable challenge of convincing affected communities that political considerations are not a factor in the BRAC decision making process. Your efforts to assure the integrity of the process are appreciated.

Thank you for considering these very important issues.

Sincerely,

STEPHEN HORN,
U.S. Representative.

ATTACHMENT A

SEC. 2903 (D)(2)(B) AND (C) OF PUBLIC LAW 101-510

"(B)" Subject to subparagraph (C), in making "its recommendations, the Commission may make changes in any of the recommendations made by the Secretary if the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1) in making recommendations.

"(C) In the case of a change described in subparagraph (D) in the recommendations made by the Secretary, the Commission may make the change only if the Commission—

"(i) makes the determination required by subparagraph (B);

"(ii) determines that the change is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1);

"(iii) publishes a notice of the proposed change in the Federal Register not less than 30 days before transmitting its recommendations to the president pursuant to paragraph (2); and

"(iv) conducts public hearings on the proposed change."

ATTACHMENT B

LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

Examples of Where the Navy/Department of Defense Substantially Deviated from the Future Force Structure Plan and the Preestablished Final Selection Criteria:

1. The Navy predetermined the fate of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard (Long Beach NSY).

Shifting critical workload away.

Ignored a \$100 million offer by the Port of Long Beach to consolidate facilities from the Naval Station for Shipyard convenience. Why?

Studied feasibility of bringing a floating drydock from Hawaii to San Diego (The Machinist).

Never included the Long Beach NSY in the Regional Maintenance Center concept, but did include the Puget Sound and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyards.

Has postponed the transfer of surplus Naval Station property from BRAC 91 to BRAC 95. Is there a connection?

2. The Navy states future uncertainties of the force structure prevent the closure of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (Portsmouth NSY).

Public Law 101-510 clearly states that the force structure plan for fiscal years 1995 through 2001 be the basis for making recommendations for base closures and realignments.

The Navy argues, that the uncertainty of the future submarine force (including future proposed new construction) including beyond 2001 is a valid and essential consideration.

This is clearly outside the future force structure plan parameters established by Public Law 101-510.

3. Using the new force structure as the reason not to need Drydock #1.

In BRAC 1992 and BRAC 1993, the Navy stated that Drydock #1 was essential for conventional aircraft carrier (CV) and nuclear aircraft carrier (CVN) emergent docking on the west coast.

Additionally, in BRAC 1991 and BRAC 1993 the Navy stated unequivocally that it could not fulfill its Pacific Fleet mission requirements without Drydock #1.

There are still twelve aircraft carriers in the Fleet with six homeported in the Pacific area.

The percentage of large deck ships in the new force structure is increasing.

Drydock #1 is one of two drydocks on the entire west coast capable of docking EVERY SHIP IN THE NAVY including CVNs and submarines. Once this asset is lost, its lost forever.

4. The Navy used different economic data and thresholds in its analysis of installations considered for closure.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance in the BRAC process stipulates that economic impact is to be assessed at the economic area level (metropolitan statistical area or county).

The Navy evaluated the potential impact of closing the Long Beach NSY based on this criteria.

Four California installations were removed by the Navy due to cumulative total direct and indirect job change, even though military value considerations presented them as viable candidates for closure.

Long Beach's cumulative total direct and indirect job change is higher than three of these installations.

Thus, the Navy applied economic impact criteria differently between the Long Beach NSY and the other four Navy installations. Again, the Navy/Department of Defense substantially deviated from the final selection criteria.

5. The Navy recommended the closure of the Long Beach NSY and not the Portsmouth NSY.

The military value of the Long Beach NSY was higher than the Portsmouth NSY.

The BRAC 1995 final selection criteria are weighted heavily toward military value.

The Navy contends that nuclear issues significantly outweigh the established selection criteria, therefore the Portsmouth NSY should not be closed.

This is a substantial deviation from the final selection criteria.

Therefore, if the Portsmouth NSY remains open, the Long Beach NSY should also remain open due to substantial deviation in the final selection criteria.

6. The Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) developed data call scenarios, military value criteria and their evaluation criteria in a manner that was prejudicial and caused the Long Beach NSY to obtain lower scores.

This accounts for the Long Beach NSY having a military value of 48.7 in 1993 and 38.04 in 1995.

The Department of Defense did not establish new final selection criteria between 1993 and 1995. Thus, based on the final selection criteria, the relative rankings of the military value of shipyards should not have changed.

Thus, there was a substantial deviation from the established final selection criteria.

7. The Navy used different and possibly non-existent selection criteria in its consideration of private shipyards on the east coast and the west coast.

The Navy has stated on the record that regardless of whether technical capabilities or capacity exist, the private sector on the east coast can not and should not absorb transferred workload from east coast public shipyards. Ironically, both Newport News and Electric Boat have the capability and capacity to handle any transferred workload from the Portsmouth NSY.

The Navy contends that it is acceptable for the majority of the Long Beach NSY's transferred workload to be absorbed by the west coast private shipyards. However, the small private shipyards on the west coast do not have the capability to handle large deck ships.

The 1995 BRAC process does not list the quantitation of private sector capabilities as a part of the final selection criteria.

8. The Navy badly underestimated the cost of closure (\$74.53 million).

The Navy's cost of closure budget submitted to Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) is \$433 million. Some sources have indicated that NAVSEA considers this estimate too low. [See attached letter from Commander, Long Beach Naval Shipyard, dated May 17, 1995.]

Over \$500 million of additional workman's compensation costs over a 20 year period were not included.

Thus, the cost of closure is understated by \$858 million. If the costs of homeporting CVNs at North Island as opposed to the Long Beach NSY are properly calculated and included, Long Beach NSY closure costs may exceed \$1 billion.

9. The Navy calculates a 20 year Return on Investment of at least \$1.948 billion. The Navy says this is due to workload shifting to other shipyards. Independent estimates, based on the workload planning for the Long Beach NSY for fiscal years 1996 through 2001, show that performing this work at other locations will cost about \$450 million less than at the Long Beach NSY. The result is a break even point of about 40 years rather than the Navy's claim of an immediate return on investment. The workman's compensation included in the Long Beach NSY costs, which must be paid whether the Long Beach NSY closes or not, will wipe out the \$450 million savings.

10. The data call scenarios and military value criteria established by the BSAT included many factors intended to address nuclear issues. Yet, the Navy now argues that the nuclear issues alone are sufficient grounds to keep the Portsmouth NSY open and close the Long Beach NSY. The Navy now contends;

No nuclear shipyard should be closed.

All non-nuclear work can be done in nuclear shipyards, but nuclear work can only be done in nuclear shipyards.

However, nuclear issues always seem to be unclear. The facts are that the only components on any nuclear ship that are "nuclear" are the reactor compartment, the cooling systems, and the propulsion systems. Nuclear certification is required to work on these, and only these components.

It is estimated that 85% of a nuclear ship work package is conventional work and can be done in non-nuclear shipyards.

The Long Beach NSY with its nuclear certified drydock could work on any nuclear ship with the assistance of tiger teams from a nuclear shipyard.

Is the BRAC Commission prepared to:

Balance the true cost of keeping this strategic waterfront ship repair facility against the unknown future needs of our Navy and our national defense.

Lose the capability and the strategic location of the Long Beach NSY's Drydock #1. Once closed, Drydock #1 will be lost forever.

Close the one public shipyard that complied with Department of Defense guidance to install more efficient management, right-sized, and has returned money to the taxpayer six years in a row. Long Beach NSY is the only public shipyard operating in the black. What kind of a message does this send to other federal facilities that are attempting to become more efficient to ensure their long-term survival.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD,
Long Beach, CA, May 17, 1995.

From: Commander, Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

To: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 97E).

Subject: FY96 Budget Submission.

Enclosure: (1) Overview Data for the FY96 DBOF Budget. (2) Long Beach Naval Shipyard Base Closure Budget.

1. Enclosures (1) and (2) are submitted as the Overview Data for the FY96 DBOF Budget and the Long Beach Naval Shipyard Base Closure Budget.

J.A. PICKERING.

EXHIBIT BCIV-02—BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (1995) COMMISSION—FINANCIAL SUMMARY

[In thousands of dollars]

		Fiscal year						
		1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Activity: Long Beach Naval Complex								
UIC:								
Funded								
One-time implementation costs:								
Military construction								
Family housing								
Construction								
Operations								
Environmental								
Studies								
Compliance								
Restoration								
Operation and maintenance		13,980	60,550					74,530
Military personnel—PCS								
HAP								
Other								
Total		13,980	60,550					74,530
Unfunded								
One-time implementation costs:								
Military construction		3,100	9,300					12,400
Family housing								
Construction								
Operations								
Environmental		15,597	17,455					33,052
Studies								
Compliance								
Restoration								
Operation and maintenance		73,460	135,499	20,739	15,695	15,729	15,765	276,887
Military personnel—PCS								
HAP			36,363					36,363
Other								
Total		92,157	198,617	20,739	15,695	15,729	15,765	358,702
Total Requirement								
One-time implementation costs:								
Military construction		3,100	9,300					12,400
Family housing								
Construction								
Operations								
Environmental		15,597	17,455					33,052
Studies								
Compliance								
Restoration								
Operation and maintenance		87,440	196,049	20,739	15,695	15,729	15,765	351,417
Military personnel—PCS								
Other			36,363					36,363
Total		106,137	259,167	20,739	15,695	15,729	15,765	433,232

[Memorandum from U.S. Representative
Stephen Horn, June 20, 1995]

PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE 1995 ROUND OF MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510) and subsequent changes made by the Congress (Public Law 102-311 and Public Law 102-484) were designed to provide a fair and impartial process for the timely closure and realignment of domestic military installations. One of the primary objectives of this legislation was to move the closure of military installations outside of the political arena, and to base installation closure actions on the future force structure plan and preestablished final selection criteria.

Most of the actions which have been taken by the Department of Defense and past Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commissions appear to have fulfilled these objectives. However, the actions taken by the Navy, the Department of Defense, the President, and certain Republican Presidential candidates in regard to attempting to prevent the closure of one military installation in New Hampshire appear to violate the spirit and intent of the law and are unprecedented. It appears that the actions being taken to save the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard are driven by the 1996 New Hampshire Presidential Primary as opposed to the criteria established in Public Law 101-510.

In regard to the Navy's actions in developing the data base which resulted in the Department of Defense not recommending the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard for closure, a few examples are relevant.

1. The Navy deviated from the future force structure plan parameters established in

Public Law 101-510 in an attempt to prevent closure of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.

Public Law 101-510 clearly states that the Force Structure Plan for fiscal years 1995 through 2001 be the basis for making recommendations for base closures and realignments.

The Navy argues that the uncertainty of the future submarine force (including future proposed new construction) including beyond 2001 is a valid and essential consideration.

This is outside the force structure parameters established by Public law 101-510.

2. The Navy recommended that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard remain open and that another shipyard with a higher military value be closed. The BRAC 1995 final selection criteria is weighted heavily toward military value. Thus, there is a substantial deviation from the established selection criteria.

3. The Navy attempted to develop their data call scenarios and military value criteria in a manner that was prejudicial and would result in the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard obtaining a higher score.

Many factors were included which addressed nuclear issues.

The weighing of military value components was changed to favor the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.

The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was still ranked the second lowest in military value.

The Navy now contends that nuclear issues alone are sufficient grounds to keep the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard open, regardless of the fact that they were adequately considered in the calculation of military value. This is a substantial deviation from the established final selection criteria.

There is also evidence that the Department of Defense took certain actions in an attempt to assure that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard would remain open. The Department of Defense established a Joint Cross-Service Group to review base closure recommendations in regard to inter-servicing. The Joint Cross Services Group analyzed and reviewed six primary scenarios for naval shipyard closures. Only one of these options concluded that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard should remain open. Yet, when the Department of Defense made its final recommendations, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was not among the military installations that it recommended for closure.

In late January, President Clinton told a Manchester, New Hampshire radio station audience that he did not believe the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard would be on the list of military installations the Navy and Department of Defense would be recommending for closure. This was about a month before the Department of Defense recommendations were released. These kinds of statements by the President certainly must have had some effect on Navy and Department of Defense officials who were in the process of making the final decisions on which installations to recommend for closure.

After the Department of Defense made their final base closure recommendations, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission technical staff conducted an extensive analysis of whether the recommendation not to close the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard conformed to the legislated future force structure plan and final selection criteria requirements. The technical staff then made the recommendation to add the Portsmouth

Naval Shipyard to those military installations being considered for closure. On May 10, 1995, the Commission voted six to two to add the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to the list of bases being considered for closure. It is interesting that the two members of the Commission who voted against adding the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to the list were appointed to the Commission by Senator Robert Dole, a 1996 Republican Presidential candidate.

Adding the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard for consideration caused President Clinton to conduct interviews with four New Hampshire radio stations stating he did not believe that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard will be shut down by the Commission and that he stands behind the Pentagon's original list of base closures. "I support the Secretary of Defense's recommendations, and I believe that they will be upheld."

Although such behavior, while not appropriate, is expected of politicians, one might not expect that the White House would ask the Navy and Department of Defense to go outside the guidelines established by Public Law 101-510 to attempt to unduly influence and intimidate the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. There was so much political heat that all eight Commissioners decided that they had better attend the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard site visit and regional hearing. In the entire history of the base closure and realignment process, all of the Commissioners have never attended a site visit and regional hearing for one particular installation.

Perhaps one of the reasons all eight Commissioners decided to attend was because they knew the Navy was sending its "Big Guns" to shepherd these events. Conducting the site visit were Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment Robert B. Pirrie, Chief of Naval Operations Jeremy M. Boorda, and the Director of Naval Reactors Admiral Bruce DeMars. This is unprecedented. Never in the entire history of the base closure process, have such senior members of a military service attended an installation site visit. In addition, Vice Admiral George Sterner, Commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command, testified in support of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard at the regional hearing. Again, this has never happened in conjunction with any potential base closure and is unprecedented.

No supportable analytical data was presented by the Navy or Portsmouth Naval Shipyard advocates at the regional hearing. Instead, the Navy simply said over and over again that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was absolutely essential for the Navy to continue its mission, and regardless of the lower military value ranking and discrepancies in the data base, the Navy's judgement should be upheld by the Commission. At one point in the hearing Senator William Cohen lectured the Commission and implied that the Commissioners did not have the technical expertise to question subjective judgements made by the Navy. One can only wonder if all of these high level Federal officials were ordered to the site visit and the regional hearing in an attempt to intimidate the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

At this point, one might ask:

Why was the Navy and Department of Defense willing to deviate substantially from the future force structure plan and the preestablished final selection criteria and recommend that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard remain open?

Why did the Commissioners appointed by Senator Robert Dole vote against adding the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to the list of military installations the Commission is considering for closure?

What is so important about the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard?

The importance of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is that the vast majority of its personnel live in New Hampshire, the State that has the first 1996 presidential primary. President Clinton, Governor Wilson, and Senator Dole all want a strong showing. The fact that three incumbent presidents, Johnson Carter, and Bush, all lost their presidencies in part due to an early challenge from within their own parties has not been lost on President Clinton and his advisors. The fact that should the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard close, New Hampshire voters might take their frustration out on Republican candidates who they thought could and should have been able to save it, has not been lost on Governor Wilson or Senator Dole.

This all makes good sense if you are a Presidential candidate, but how about:

Good government?

Circumventing the spirit and intent of legislation that was expressly passed to insure a fair and impartial base closure process?

Should the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard be held to the same standards as other military installations which will be closed?

What about the families and workers who lose their jobs due to base closures because their State does not have the first presidential primary?

The real message in the 1994 elections was not a shift from the Democratic to the Republican party. What the American Public was trying to tell its elected officials is that it is tired of a government which does not work, and makes decisions based on political considerations instead of the merits of the situation. The situation created by the intense political effort to keep the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard open and the upcoming 1996 New Hampshire Presidential Primary is exactly what the American Public voted against in 1994. Hopefully, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission will make its ultimate decision based on the merits rather than politics.

Mr. HORN. The politics of the services seem to be overriding. This year Admiral Boorda walked into a meeting and said, "Let's save all the nuclear shipyards." There is only one non-nuclear shipyard and that is the one that is the most efficient: Long Beach. So that was Death Knell I for Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

Mr. Speaker, it was the wrong way to go about it. Admiral Boorda looked me in the eye a month before the decision was made and said, "Gee, I was sort of out of the loop. I didn't have anything to do with it." I thought that was a little strange for the Chief of Naval Operations, but so be it.

But then we had the President in Connecticut asked about Portsmouth. There is something that goes on in New Hampshire every 4 years that I guess guided this answer. He was not alone. He had Republican candidates say just what he said. "Aw, shucks, I sure hope that they keep Portsmouth open," was the attitude. That was a month before the decision was made in the Navy. That was Death Knell II.

Mr. Speaker, naval political appointees are not stupid. When the boss says keep one open, it meant the death knell of the other one who had been ahead of Portsmouth, and even though they juggled the numbers and tried to make it the other way, was still one-

tenth of a point ahead of Portsmouth on what really counts and that is the military value.

We can argue all the disasters to unemployment, and indeed they are. Long Beach as a city has suffered more than 46 States in base closure. In 1991, we had the naval station and the hospital close. In 1995, the shipyard.

As I said, this is not partisan and does not affect seniority here. My colleagues will remember the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS], the distinguished former chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, Mare Island and Alameda were closed. The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on National Security, ranking Republican then, Charleston was closed.

My predecessor, Glenn Anderson, two decades in Congress, a committee chairman; the naval station and naval hospital were closed.

What bothers me though is that partisan politics got into it with reference to New Hampshire, and yet the President made an impassioned speech that morning, and later in the day he simply signed the recommendations of the defense bureaucrats and politicians and sent them to Congress.

And, finally, there was the former Senator from Illinois, Mr. Alan Dixon, who was the President's choice for chairman of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Never have I seen such an arbitrary chairman. He remains unmatched in my mind as I compare him to some of the well-known autocratic chairs that existed in the House and the Senate over the last half century.

Before the Commission's own staff presentation on the Long Beach Naval Shipyard was completed, Chairman Dixon arbitrarily shut it off, refused to delay the vote until after lunch, and generally harangued his colleagues. That was Death Knell III.

And so a great naval shipyard—the youngest, born in 1943; the most modern; the most efficient and effective of any shipyard will be no more. No longer will 70 percent of the surface ships in the Pacific Fleet be within 100 miles of this great facility. Those vessels will have to travel 1,600 to 2,600 miles to secure comparable service. No longer will a great work force of 3,000 dedicated men and women, a 60-percent minority and women work force be available to serve well the Navy and the Nation. This is indeed a sad day in the military history of our country.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution, in favor of the Base Closure Commission recommendations.

Mr. Speaker, this is not an easy process. It is often painful. But, Mr. Speaker, it is a very necessary process for us to go through.

We like to point out that we have a wonderful military, and the military

did its job during the cold war. It was necessary during that era to have an extremely large and strong multibased, multipost military within our country.

We won the cold war, and to those who are losing installations in their area, they nevertheless should take pride in the fact that they did their job. The men and women, civilian, military, at those particular posts, installations, did an excellent job in protecting freedom through the years.

But this process is one that I have watched. I had the opportunity to testify in front of the Base Closure Commission. I found them to be fair. I found them to listen. I found them to read and understand the facts. They also visited the various installations throughout the country.

Mr. Speaker, I hope that this body will give a strong vote of support for the Base Closure Commission, voting against this resolution, because this is the only process available to save money so that we will have those dollars to modernize our military; to take care of the needs, the family needs, the family housing; to make sure we do not cut our military too small. Mr. Speaker, these Base Closure Commission savings will help us do that.

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Ms. DELAURO].

Ms. DELAURO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the resolution to reject the recommendations of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

I support the base closure and realignment process and believe it has led to the orderly downsizing of our Nation's defense infrastructure, given the end of the cold war. The Department of Defense and the Commission have made a tremendous effort to carefully examine every base during this and prior base closure rounds.

Nonetheless, I continue to believe the Commission made a shortsighted decision when it voted to close the Stratford, CT, Army Engine Plant. I believe that the Army has substantially understated the military value of the Stratford plant, and it has substantially underestimated the cost of closing the facility and reconstituting its capabilities elsewhere.

The Stratford Army Engine Plant is the only place in the country where we build the AGT1500 tank engines and critical spare parts that will be used in the Abrams tank for the next 30 years. In my view, it is a tremendous risk to national security to close this plant and lose its unique capabilities. With no new tank engine in development, we need the Stratford plant to extend the life of the engines now in use; to build critical spares; to provide field expertise to resolve problems that arise in battlefield situations; and to quickly build new engines should that be required by a military emergency.

I also remain skeptical about the feasibility of the Army's plan to reconstitute the dual-use technology that the Stratford plant has used to produce top

quality engines for tanks, helicopters, hovercraft and commercial jets.

The Army has proposed moving the helicopter work to Corpus Christi, TX and the tank work to Anniston, AL. But this is much simpler said than done. The same equipment and the same work force teams at the plant produce military and commercial products for both aviation and ground use. All but 2 of 11 manufacturing cells are dual-use, as is the vast majority of machines. Recreating this capability elsewhere will be expensive and time consuming.

I also believe the Army has substantially underestimated the cost of closing the plant.

This year, the Army itself recognized that our Nation's tank engine industrial base would benefit from continued operation of the Stratford plant as a dual-use manufacturing facility. In February, the Army announced that it would invest \$47.5 million to downsize the facility, enhance engine durability, and initiate a Service Life Extension Program. The employees of the plant, the union members, and the management joined together to make this plan work—they are cutting costs, improving productivity, and diversifying the product line into the commercial marketplace.

This dual-use approach would maintain the vital military value of the Stratford Army Engine Plant, while reducing costs to the Army by expanding commercial use of the plant. This would be the best option for national security and the best option for the taxpayer.

It is hard to understand why the Stratford Army Engine Plant was recommended for closure when a promising plan for downsizing and dual-use manufacturing was already in place. I was disappointed by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendation to close the Stratford site and joined the plant's workers and management, and the community in making our case to the Commission. I still believe maintaining military and commercial production at Stratford would serve our country best.

I urge my colleagues to support the resolution of disapproval.

□ 0940

Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DOOLITTLE]. He is from an adjoining district to mine who has fought staunchly for McClellan Air Force Base.

(Mr. DOOLITTLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Speaker, I have in the past supported the BRAC Commission process, viewing it as a reasonable way to effect the necessary downsizing of excess capacity.

As the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO] mentioned, I have been very involved with him, the gentleman from California [Mr. MATSUI], the gentleman from California [Mr. POMBO], the gentleman from California [Mr.

HERGER], and others from our region in fighting for McClellan Air Force Base. I can tell you that the gentleman from Utah [Mr. HANSEN] was right last year or the year before when he proposed cutting off the process after the first three rounds. I am sorry that we have gone to the fourth round. The fourth round has disappointed me.

The idea that we somehow remove politics from the BRAC process, in my opinion, did not turn out to be the case. In fact, it reminds me of the method for selecting judges advocated by the American Bar Association throughout the country where all they do is shift the politics from the more open forum of the Governor, et cetera, and move it back behind closed doors where intense logrolling and politicking is going on. We should have had cross-servicing. That would have saved McClellan Air Force Base. It is a modern base capable of doing the job. But, no, despite the fact that every major panel has recommended cross-servicing, we do not have it. It is not part of our defense policy. It is a tragedy, Mr. Speaker.

We should pass this resolution. We should go back to the drawing boards. We should get cross-servicing in as part of this, and if we are going to have politics in the process, then let us get it out in the open.

Mr. Speaker, I must add I am disappointed in the President. The President told the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO] and me of his keen awareness of how California has had 15 percent of the military personnel around the country and suffered 85 percent of the personnel reductions, and yet when the time came, when the one person that could have intervened to make a difference here could have exercised that, he did not.

With the privatization we have got, even that is slipping. I intend to fight for that. I urge approval of this resolution.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON].

(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to oppose the resolution and to ask our colleagues to support the recommendations of the BRAC Commission.

I cannot help but note the irony of today's debate. Where are our colleagues who yesterday were on the House floor saying that we have not cut defense; where are they today? Are they hiding in their offices? We heard all of these Members stand up and say we are not doing enough to cut defense. We need to the defense budget more and more. Where are they today as we are about to decide to close a number of additional installations that will affect ultimately over 1 million American people in both the services, the uniforms,

and the industrial segment of our community and society who supports the military?

Why are these cuts occurring? They are occurring because we have been on a dramatic downsizing of the military, unlike any other period in the history of this country, down to 3 percent of our GNP, and 16 cents of every Federal dollar, when you compare it to John Kennedy's tenure where we were spending 9 percent of our GNP and 55 cents of every Federal dollar on the military.

We have made dramatic cuts. You are seeing the results of those cuts partially today.

I think the BRAC Commission did a commendable job. I am not happy with everything they did. I have been trying for 8 years to close a facility in my old hometown. I testified three times before the commission, "Close this Army facility down. We don't want it. The town doesn't want it. The county doesn't want it." Again, it is not on the list for closure. So I do not like that, and I will be happy to be back again next year either legislatively or before the BRAC Commission to close it again.

I can tell you this Commission accepted a higher percentage of Pentagon recommendations than any other commission, and despite what President Clinton said, this Commission came up with more savings than what the administration had.

But what really outrages me, what really outrages me as a member of the Committee on National Security and as someone who is going to, at the end of this month, see the last of 13,000 workers leave the Philadelphia Navy Yard, the Philadelphia Navy Base, and before that, the Philadelphia naval hospital, is to see this President play partisan politics with the lives of people in the military. It is an absolutely disgusting outrage. Again, this President wants to have it both ways. He does not have the backbone or the guts to stand up and disapprove the list and send it back for a reconsideration of McClellan or Kelly. What does he do? He signs it and then sends a letter down saying, "I really don't want to sign it."

Mr. Speaker, that is absolutely outrageous. But that is what this President did.

I would like to, at this point in time, ask the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, is it your distinguished interpretation that that letter has absolutely no legal standing whatsoever in this process?

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. HEFLEY. I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON] I absolutely agree with him.

It has no legal standing as far as we can determine. Our committee did consider this, and let me just quote from the committee report just a moment:

In our judgment, the letter of the President of July 13, 1995, communicating his approval of the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Committee, has no standing beyond certification. Public Law 101-510 does not provide for any such communication to contain assumptions about the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank the chairman for that comment.

I would add it is the feeling of this committee that that letter has no standing whatsoever. It is a political document.

But I would say to the President, Where is your letter for the 13,000 Philadelphia, PA, tri-State workers that are going to be laid off at the end of this month? Where is your letter of concern for them? Where is your letter of concern for all of those other bases, or are we just pandering to one State because of the electoral votes there?

Mr. Speaker, I am absolutely outraged at, again, the lowness of the depths that this President would take in this process. He has demeaned the Commission. He has demeaned the process. But somehow that does not surprise me.

Vote "no."

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. EVANS].

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the resolution of disapproval. I must do this because I am deeply disturbed by the base closure process. In the rush to close installations there has been a failure to analyze all of the facts carefully. This is obvious from the recommendation made by the Commission concerning the Savanna Army depot activity.

In the case of Savanna, the Commission ignored a number of important factors. For example, closing the installation would result in the loss of important and hard to replicate capabilities, increase costs above the Army estimate to close the base and move its functions, and reduce ammo storage capability below critical military needs.

For instance, the Commission failed to consider that Savanna is one of the most efficient facilities in the Army. During Desert Storm, Savanna had the highest outloading rate of any depot. It is also one of the few with adequate rail service to shipping centers. These national assets would be hard to replace in a nationwide mobilization.

In addition, the estimate of the cost of closing Savanna and relocating the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School [USADACS] is too low. DOD stated that it would cost \$38 million to close the installation and relocate functions. However, the Savanna Army depot realignment task force estimates that the cost of closing the facility and moving the school is much higher—as much as \$88 million. This includes new construction that will have to take place at McAlester to complete the move.

Even more important, the decision to close ammunition storage facilities

failed to take into account storage needs. The Army's 1993 Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Program study indicated that even with 11 depots, as much as 6 million square feet of outside storage will be needed to match our Nation's future ammunition stockpile. This could indicate that the ammunition study is flawed. Because of this decision, we may not have enough space to meet future storage needs.

Our ammunition depots are a national asset that will be needed to meet future mobilization needs. The Commission's recommendation will mean the loss of an important part of this irreplaceable asset.

I believe that we must reject the recommendations made by the Commission. From the errors I have seen made in just the case of the Savanna Army depot activity, I am concerned that other mistakes may have been made that will force us to make poor choices concerning our Nation's defense infrastructure and unnecessarily eliminate the jobs of thousands of civilian employees who have served our Nation proudly. I hope my colleagues will join me in opposing these recommendations.

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Guam [Mr. UNDERWOOD].

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, as I have pointed out on several occasions previously, no community is more negatively affected on a per capita basis by the BRAC 1955 decisions than Guam. We are losing a ship repair facility and a fleet industrial supply center, the only such facilities on U.S. soil on the other side of the international dateline, and potentially some 10 percent of our total work force on Guam will be affected.

My community, small and loyal, will be suffering. But my point here in standing in support of House Joint Resolution 102 is not just to bemoan the effects of the BRAC process on a small island 9,000 miles away, with no electoral votes to give and no vote to cast on this floor. My purpose is to draw attention to the disjunctures in the BRAC process, to point out that the forward positioning of U.S. forces in Asia is benefiting foreign countries over U.S. communities.

On the very day the BRAC process was announced, riggers at the ship repair facility on Guam were offered positions at the Yokosuka ship repair facility in Japan, and to point out that America's war fighting capacity in Asia is overly dependent upon the stationing of forces in foreign countries when U.S. soil is available, and to point out that the BRAC process ignored the sound advice of people in uniform and favored the bean counters, the so-called men in suits in the Pentagon.

For the record, I would like to point out that even as BRAC put forth a disagreeable decision, Guam is determined to make the best of it and to

survive. In this, I have asked the Department of Defense and the administration to give Guam the same consideration that other communities are apparently receiving. In short, we are asking for the best arrangements possible, a kind of most-favored-base closing treatment.

I recognize that the resolution may not pass, and I do not intend to confound the laws which govern the BRAC process and which have served the country generally well. But consider casting a symbolic vote to send a message regarding the 1995 process.

Support the Tejeda resolution.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. FOWLER].

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution now pending before us.

Last year I joined with those who supported postponing the 1995 base closure round. But the amendment to postpone it was opposed by the Defense Department, which argued that it needed these savings for systems modernization and other recapitalization efforts, and this effort was soundly defeated.

Thus, the 1995 base closure deliberations proceeded. Ultimately, the Base Closure Commission recommended the closure or realignment of 132 installations, including 123 of the Secretary of Defense's 146 recommendations. The projected savings total \$19.3 billion over 20 years.

I do not agree with every one of these decisions, and I sympathize deeply with those of my colleagues who lost facilities in the 1995 BRAC process. Northeast Florida will lose thousands of military billets as a result of the 1993 base closure round, so I am quite familiar with that pain.

But the Commission, the Pentagon, and the GAO did a huge amount of work to reach their conclusions in this round. They worked in good faith. The national security calculations were made. The savings are now budgeted. It makes no sense to dismiss this enormous effort now. We should vote down this resolution.

Having said that, I must register my grave concern about the manner in which the President responded to the Commission's recommendations. It is my strong view that he has sought to interject politics into this process by calling for the privatization in place of two major Air Force logistics facilities that the Commission ordered closed.

In doing so, he has articulated a plan that undermines the entire purpose behind base closure law, which is to reduce the Pentagon's excess capacity. By privatizing in place, the administration not only fails to eliminate this excess capacity, but it exacerbates the current excess capacity problems at those facilities that the Commission deemed, after a careful review of objective criteria, to be our most efficient.

Instead of performing America's essential military maintenance functions

at those facilities the Commission preserved, the administration would perform them at the facilities deemed least deserving. It would then further subject these mission critical functions to a very risky new private management scheme.

To top it off, his plan would violate current law if carried to fruition.

I urge a no vote on this resolution, but more important, I hope my colleagues will oppose the administration's attempts to subvert the BRAC process for political gain.

Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. POMBO], a gentleman who has worked very closely with us since his arrival in Congress to save McClellan Air Force Base.

(Mr. POMBO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. POMBO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this resolution, and in strong opposition to the 1995 defense base closure recommendations forwarded to Congress by the President.

I oppose this list for reasons both broad and specific. Specifically, the inclusion of McClellan AFB on this list is wholly unacceptable. The Sacramento area of California has already suffered through two previous rounds of base closures resulting in the total loss of over 28,000 jobs. The closure of McClellan will add another 13,000 direct, and many more indirect, jobs to that figure.

This BRAC list calls for the closure of McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases. This represents the costliest, most disruptive way to eliminate excess capacity in the Air Force depot system—and will have the worst impact on military mission support capabilities.

More broadly, however, I am concerned that we are cutting muscle, and not just fat, with this round of closures. After extensive visits and consultations, I am convinced that there are serious questions of national security arising from this BRAC list.

Once we close a military facility, we will never get it back. Therefore, it is common sense that we must be cautious and discerning about each and every facility we close.

At issue here is, first and foremost, an issue of America's military preparedness, and of our ability to influence and shape global affairs into the next century. I have not yet seen a serious, detailed, and integrated plan for our future security requirements that analyzes base closures in light of the needs of our 21st century military. I believe that such a plan must be produced and debated prior to closing scores of military bases, and most especially before consideration is given to closing McClellan Air Force Base.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. WATTS].

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Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, President Harry Truman once said, "Every segment of our population and every individual has the right to expect from our Government a fair deal."

Mr. Speaker, the BRAC process was a fair deal for every individual in this country. Before the BRAC process, bases did not close, downsizing was simply a theory, and the American taxpayer was charged with unnecessary bills for the maintenance of excess capacity in our Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

The BRAC process closes unneeded military installations. Military facilities across the land compete on a level playing field. Some win, some lose, but the fight is fair and without the political influence of the Congress or the President. The victors should be honored and now is the time to stand up and do what is right for this country and her people. This BRAC has left some in the executive branch with a message they could not politically swallow. They are now attempting to corrupt a fair process that estimates a savings of more than \$19 billion. Well, this Congressman and many who sit on both sides of the aisle simply will not tolerate that and will fight to make certain the BRAC process remains as apolitical as was originally intended.

BRAC is a proven process and to dismantle that process by disapproving the list would, in the words of Chairman Alan Dixon, "destroy the BRAC process forever and fail to save an estimated 19 billion dollars." That is simply not an acceptable course of action.

Disagreements between how the BRAC list will be implemented will lead to heated discussions throughout this Congress. I am especially upset about the President's decision to privatize-in-place at McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases. The President's decision to accept the BRAC list with a privatize-in-place option is a play that wasn't in the play book or within the rules of the game. He has taken an apolitical process and turned it into a zero-sum-game. If this Congress allows the Department of Defense to privatize-in-place, we will never achieve the savings that were clearly identified by the BRAC's recommendation, nor will the BRAC process retain the credibility it has worked so hard to achieve.

But that fight is for another day. Today, we face the question of rejecting the BRAC list. This question has but one answer—"No."

Today, we must do what it takes to deliver on our promise for a fair deal to those we represent. To do this there is only one reasonable action; accept the BRAC recommendation by voting down the resolution to disapprove recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

I ask you to do the right thing and cast your vote against the resolution to disapprove the BRAC recommendation.

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4½ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. MENENDEZ].

(Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to reject the BRAC Commission's recommendation because they violated not only the spirit of the law, but the letter of the law that empowers them to close bases in the first place, and, as an example of that I am deeply disturbed by the conduct of the BRAC Commission with respect to the Military Ocean Terminal, Bayonne, NJ, specifically with regard to the recommendation to eliminate dedicated military ocean terminals. Never before has the Commission decided, on its own initiative, to virtually eliminate an entire military mission. Ironically, the Commission found precisely what I had alleged—that the Secretary had substantially deviated from the selection criteria in its recommendation to close MOTBY which is grounds for removal from the list. However, the Commission far exceeded its statutory charter by expanding the scope of realignments and eliminated the entire military ocean terminal mission.

Let me outline the numerous legal and factual errors that the BRAC failed to take into account in their sloppy, haphazard proceedings.

First, a fatally flawed recommendation from the Secretary to close the Army portion of MOTBY without regard for the cross service assessment of the Navy Military Sealift Command, leaving this agency stranded, required removal of the base from the list.

Second, this legal error was further tainted by a legally invalid attempt to rescue the first recommendation by closing and not enclaving MSC. This is an unlawful expansion of the scope of realignment because the BRAC failed to add the MSC enclave at the legal deadline for the consideration of additional bases.

Third, the BRAC, Navy and DoD have violated the letter and intent of the BRAC statute by increasing the scope of activities to be realigned away from Bayonne 1 week away from the Commission's final round of hearings. This left the community with no time to respond to the proposed revisions.

Fourth, the BRAC on its own motion realigned activities away from MOTBY to a so-called Base X. This is a violation of its own selection criteria 2, regarding the availability and condition of land and facilities at potential receiving locations. The Commission has failed to follow its own rules. By randomly assigning missions to mythical bases, the cost and manpower implications of criteria 4 become infinite.

Fifth, although the BRAC has limited judicial review of its actions, it is clear that this is a major abuse of discretion in two areas. The BRAC's actions are ultra vires and wildly beyond the bounds of its enabling statute and the Commission has completely failed to follow its own regulations.

I do not want to seem to be calling sour grapes over this decision. I want to establish a record because in the next few weeks legislation, which is equally ill conceived, and proves my case today. This legislation greatly threatens the military and economic security of the United States. The Ocean Shipping Reform Act, when combined with the closure of the dedicated military ocean terminals at both Bayonne and Oakland, poses the most serious threat to our Nation's ability to mobilize in this century.

There are compelling military value reasons to reject MOTBY's closure. MOTBY is a unique strategic asset. No other port on the east or gulf coasts, commercial or military, can duplicate its combination of advantages in the support of power projection from the continental United States without the disruption of commercial port activities. This was amply demonstrated during the Gulf war and our recent operations in Somalia and Haiti.

Having investigated and documented this matter fully, it was shocking to see the assortment of half truths and mischaracterizations that was paraded before the Commission as analysis, without an opportunity for rebuttal. For example, the staff alleged that MOTBY was only used to mobilize the 10th Mountain Light Infantry Division when, in fact, dozens of units shipped through MOTBY as well as outsized cargo such as M1A2 tanks from as far as Fort Hood, TX.

Bayonne sits astride the huge, highly developed, multimodal transportation network of the American Northeast Corridor. Once cargo arrives at Bayonne, it can be placed directly into vast covered warehouses or uncovered—and fully secure—staging areas. All types of cargo, from heavy, outsized weapons like the M1A2 tank and the Patriot antimissile system, to the full range of munitions available to our fighting forces can be loaded by Bayonne's specially trained union force using state of the art, dedicated rail lines using every type of roll-on/roll-off vessel in the MSC inventory. Bayonne has the best steaming times to Europe, a full day's advantage over any other U.S. port, military or civilian.

Nowhere in the staff presentation was there any reflection of the shortcomings of commercial ports. For example, since most ports are containerized, there are no commercial ports which can lift the 70 tons of the M1A2 Abrams. If forced to rely on roll-on/roll-off ships in the MSC inventory, the number of useable commercial ports plummets and even the tiny, remaining Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, NC, an ammunition depot, quickly becomes unusable.

Finally as operations in the Persian Gulf, Somalia and Haiti have proven beyond doubt, MOTBY's unique heavy sealift capabilities are always available to us in a crisis. The Pentagon's recommendation that Bayonne be closed is based on the untested premise that

commercial ports on the east and gulf coasts will be both willing and able to forego their profitable contracts to accommodate time sensitive military cargo. The exact opposite of this premise was experienced with the ports of Houston and Portland during the Gulf war. Indeed, the director of port operations of the Port of New York and New Jersey, Lillian Liburdi, an acknowledged expert on military cargo management, testified that no commercial port on the east or gulf coast could substitute for MOTBY. DoD has acknowledged this by contracting with MARAD and Louisiana State University to study this very issue of commercial port availability should Bayonne be closed—a study that should have preceded any closure recommendation.

Past BRACs have wrestled with the depot issue and this BRAC has 14 boxes of studies on depots. It is extremely reckless to leap ahead with the unstudied and untested assumptions that commercial ports can replace dedicated military ports in all war fighting scenarios. It threatens the soldier waiting for resupply on the beach and it threatens the economy whose ports may be subjected to commandeering at short notice. The role of MOTBY is essential. If it is closed, we will be forced to recreate it, at enormous cost, every time we mobilize even the smallest forces.

Finally, I have taken this time to go into great detail in rebutting the Commission's finding point by point because of my great policy concern about maritime commerce. In its ignorance the Commission found, "six ports capable of deploying an infantry division within 1 day's rail movement of Bayonne." As I warned the Commission in their regional hearing, legislation deregulating of the maritime industry, in the form of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act, has already been reported out of the Committee on Transportation. Maritime deregulation will have powerful shakeouts for ports, such as airline deregulation had for airports.

Our former colleague, Helen Bentley, who had vast experience in the maritime industry, has warned that deregulation will create megaports like airline hubs. Mrs. Bentley warned that deregulation could reduce the number of ports serving the Nation to as few as four. Most small seaports will vanish. There is precedence. Just as Halifax has decimated Great Lakes ports, the passage of NAFTA and maritime deregulation could spell extinction for gulf coast ports from competition via Veracruz. Ninety-five percent of American export commerce moves by ship. If maritime deregulation occurs, there will be a vast reduction in port capacity. There will be even less willingness by the new megaports to disrupt commercial traffic by accepting military cargo on a short term basis. The military cargo charges will be at an enormous premium. Even the sloppy staff work done by the Commission showed

port operators becoming increasingly unwilling to guarantee priority to military cargo required by port planning orders. In some cases they desire 12-14 days to clear staging and berthing areas.

Unfortunately, port legal counsel on the BRAC staff failed to appreciate that the military cannot compel commercial operators to give priority to military deployments during contingency situations. Under the third and fourth amendments of the Constitution, there is no authority to disrupt commercial ports in the absence of a declared emergency. By that time it may be long after the need to mobilize and use ports. The Kuwaiti invasion was in August 1990. Congress authorized the use of force months later. Port planning orders and port allocation orders are no guarantee port access on a timely basis. The only reason these orders have worked at all in the past is the delicate balance struck in the Shipping Act of 1984 between military and necessity and good commercial practice, which tolerated excess capacity in our ports.

Today, I urge you to reject the BRAC recommendations. The Commission has far exceeded its authority into roles and missions. Moreover, they have seriously jeopardized the military readiness of the Nation. It will cost more than huge sums of money, it will cost soldiers' lives.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. CHAMBLISS].

(Mr. CHAMBLISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Members of the House recognize the importance of supporting and preserving the integrity of the BRAC process. In it, Congress has created the most politically neutral means possible of reducing our military's excessive infrastructure. Although we may not agree with individual decisions, we must support the process.

With respect to the process, however, I would like to address a situation that has arisen from the recommendations of this most recent Commission. Specifically, I refer to the President's plans for the future of our air logistics depot structure.

As my colleagues are aware, the Commission determined the Air Force maintains excess capacity in its air depots. As a result, commissioners voted to close two depots based on the objective base closure criteria.

As with all individual base closure decisions before, the two depots slated for closure would be phased out over a 5-year period. This would solve the two primary problems the BRAC was created to eliminate: excess capacity and infrastructure.

Now, Mr. Speaker, the Pentagon has come to inform Congress that under direction of this administration and the President, another plan is in the works

for the two air force depots to be closed.

Mr. Speaker, it seems the President has concluded that the loss of over 10,000 jobs in each of the very electoral-vote-rich States of California and Texas demands special attention. In order to save those jobs, and presumably those votes, the President has instructed the Secretary of Defense to devise a plan to privatize in place, in effect maintaining all depot jobs in San Antonio and Sacramento.

What the President is saying here, Mr. Speaker, is that the BRAC process is political, that an otherwise objective process is necessary until it affects his chances of reelection. The deliberate end-run this President is making around the process should offend each and every Member of this Congress that has worked within the limits of the process and every Member that has accepted the four rounds of BRAC recommendations. You know, it is not very often that this Congress agrees on a politics-free solution to the problems we face, but in this case the process must be preserved and defended.

Mr. Speaker, this President's decision to privatize in place the work performed at Sacramento and San Antonio air logistics centers nullifies the very difficult decisions made by the BRAC. The BRAC took its charge very seriously: to assess and repair a military scheme that maintained excess depot capacity and infrastructure that was out of proportion with the force structure demanded in this post-cold war world.

The commissioners accomplished their task, and by privatizing in place, the Pentagon will be overriding the commissioners' decision and embracing our status quo of excess capacity.

Let me make one point perfectly clear, to my colleagues, but more important to the President and this administration. The President's acceptance of this Commission's recommendations is just that: "acceptance." The Commission has not recommended privatization in place, or any other concoction designed to save political hides, regardless of how desperate the President is to amend the recommendations.

The President's acceptance is unconditional, and our rejection here today of the resolution before us will signal our support for this very difficult process.

I ask my colleagues to reject the joint resolution before you. The BRAC process has been many things, but it has not been political.

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. FARR].

Mr. FARR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support the resolution of disapproval.

I do so because I am concerned about the manner in which the BRAC Commission carried out its mission. I support downsizing the military and cutting the budget. But I believe it needs

to be done in a manner that is logical, fair, and honest, with the emphasis, Mr. Speaker, on honest.

In my district, the BRAC recommended that Fort Hunter Liggett be realigned. The Army told BRAC publicly and on the record, that it would only cost \$6.7 million to move the mission of Fort Hunter Liggett to Fort Bliss, TX.

The truth is, Mr. Speaker, that internal Army documents which I have obtained show a different story. Internal Army documents show that it will, in fact, cost three times that amount to move the Fort Hunter Liggett mission.

The Army told BRAC publicly and on the record, that savings of \$12.7 million would be realized from the realignment of Fort Hunter Liggett. But internal Army documents state, "There are no savings to be realized in this action."

I am not whining about having a base realigned in my district. As everyone knows, my district is the site of the largest base closure so far, that of Fort Ord. And I know from experience that as traumatic an experience as base closure can be, there is a way to turn closure into successful economic redevelopment. President Clinton was at Fort Ord just this past weekend to celebrate Fort Ord's transformation into a major educational center. So, I do not necessarily oppose base closure or realignment. What I oppose is the deliberate manipulation of the numbers by the Army and the BRAC to make their case.

The BRAC method above all must be fair and honest. I do not believe this round of closures met those criteria and that is why I support this resolution.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. LUCAS].

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Speaker, I know what an emotional issue this is, for I have been very involved in the BRAC process. I, too, had base on the closure list, Vance Air Force Base in Enid, OK. And many of my constituents work for Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City. I was fortunate, my bases are not slated for closure, but I remember the stress I felt when commissioners visited the base and when I was waiting for the final closure list.

None of us want to lose something so valuable as a base in our district.

That is why the 101st Congress created BRAC. They knew that base closures would best be handled by an unbiased, nonpartisan group. They knew that when politics are involved, base worthiness and cost-effectiveness fall by the wayside, as was demonstrated by the President earlier this year. It would be nearly impossible for Congress and the President to decide objectively which bases to close.

Sure the BRAC process has flaws, but it has worked well thus far. I do not think any of us can argue that this process was not fair and open. We each had ample opportunity to participate and to validate the information used.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to finish this process and vote "no" on the resolution of disapproval.

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Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. ORTIZ].

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Speaker, as the ranking minority member and long time participant on the Military Installations Subcommittee, I have always been skeptical of the current base closure process.

I am concerned that the process has not yielded the expected savings and I believe that Congress should at a minimum have the opportunity to amend the list.

I believe that the members of the Base Closure Commission worked in good faith and appreciate the enormity of their task.

Additionally, I support the vast majority of the recommendations of the Commission.

However, I believe that for national security reasons the Congress should overturn the closure recommendations as submitted by the President.

We have reduced our Nation's defense too much and too fast.

I believe that the closure of the Kelly Air Logistics Center at San Antonio, TX, will result in a severe degradation of readiness that cannot be overlooked.

The costs, both financially and militarily, will be enormous.

Therefore, I will support the resolution of my colleague from Texas, Congressman TEJEDA.

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. BROWDER].

Mr. BROWDER. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I think it is important for us to note what is happening today. A lot of us think that this process has gone awry, and we are speaking up about it. That does not mean that we are not trying to save money. We are honestly trying to challenge decisions that impact negatively, not only on our districts but on the national defense.

Let me say something strange, though, for someone who is opposed to one of the base closure decisions. I think that the base closure process that we have is about as fair a process as we are going to get. It is designed to close bases over objections of people who want them to stay open. So I think it is about as fair a process as we are going to get. It is a fair process. But sometimes mistakes are made.

Mr. Speaker, I am here today to call attention to one of these mistakes and to ask that a future Congress come back and take a look at what happened in this decision. I know Fort McClellan in Alabama is going to close, which is in my district. We are not going to cry over spilled milk. Fort McClellan is the home of the Army Chemical School

and the only place in the world where we can train with live agent chemical weapons on the place. Experts all over the country and internationally have testified that not only is it a mistake in these times to close Fort McClellan, but it will disrupt our capability for up to a decade. Everybody agrees on the increasing threat, not only in the world from our military enemies, but also from terrorists here domestically. This is the only place where we can prepare for this.

Now, I know they say they can move it somewhere else, but just this move experts testify will disrupt the capability for up to 10 years. Our men and women are required to be able to survive a fight in a chemical environment. This will disrupt that.

Mr. Speaker, I just want to cite one example. Back in June, the Army testified to the Base Closure Commission that the one-time closing cost of Fort McClellan was \$231 million. The next month, according to a BRAC 1995 information briefing, these are the Army's own documents, the closing costs had increased 70 percent, to \$393 million. I wish the BRAC Commission had had the real numbers.

This BRAC document has closing costs, net closing costs; that is, minus savings, that testified before the Commission in June, \$110 million. Now they say the closing costs are \$377 million. That is a 243 percent increase. Savings over 20 years, they said in June it was \$287 million, and now they say they are not available. The answer to it, in our newspaper which got this document, says the answer from the Army is we are not going to talk specific figures. It is too early.

No, Mr. Speaker, it is too late. They tortured the numbers and closed this base. It will hurt our military men and women in the future. At some point, Mr. Speaker, in the future something is going to happen with chemical weapons, an incident akin to the Beirut barracks bombing of the past, at which time there were investigations about why that was allowed to happen. Mr. Speaker, at some time in the future, we are probably going to have a chemical weapons incident, a tragedy akin to that. When we do, I hope this Congress will come back and investigate and will hold people accountable for why they not only witnessed, but accepted, and even participated in the distortion of numbers and the overriding of all of our military experts who said this is a major mistake.

Mr. Speaker, I feel somewhat like a friend of mine, Claude Harris, a former member of this body, who told me one time about a catfish, and the fisherman that caught that catfish was about to clean him and he said now, hold still, Mr. Catfish. This is not going to hurt you too much. All I am going to do is skin you and gut you. Mr. Speaker, that is what is happening here.

We are going to protest. I urge support of this resolution, but I do not think this resolution will pass, and in

some cases, such as this, the men and women who fight in our military are going to be the ones who suffer.

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ].

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution to disapprove the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

In the first place, I believe the process involved is simply a sham and evasion of the constitutional responsibility of the Congress. The Commission concept is simply a way of delegating to others not only our responsibility to determine what military forces to establish and maintain, but our fundamental legislative responsibility as well. No matter how politically easy and attractive the Commission concept is, we cannot escape the reality that when we embraced this idea, we effectively said, Congress does not want to exercise its constitutional mandate with respect to establishing and regulating the military forces of the United States—we don't even want to legislate when it comes down to issues of reducing military establishments. Therefore the process itself is one that is inimical to the vitality, the relevance, and the plain duty of the Congress. But that is an argument for a different occasion; the fact is, the Commission concept was established and in place; it will be for a future Congress to decide whether or not to embrace the idea again.

This resolution ought to be approved, because the work of the Commission is flawed, certainly with regard to the logistics support system of the Air Force.

In the past, commissions did not deviate very much from the plans and recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, but in this case the Commission made wholesale revisions. This is a dangerous precedent; it is not a Commission that must shoulder responsibility in the event of war; it is the Congress and the President. It is not a Commission that plans forces to meet contingencies, it is the President and the Secretary of Defense. It is not a Commission that votes the funds, it is the Congress. But this Commission went far afield, and made changes that fundamentally affect the ability of this country to adequately support its air forces. The fact is, if this resolution fails and the Commission recommendations take effect, the Air Force will have almost no reserve capacity for the maintenance of aircraft engines, and very little reserve capacity to maintain its aircraft. The Commission is, in effect, placing all the support needs of the Air Force in a single basket, for each major item. If any one of those places suffers an accident, there can easily be grave effects on the ability of the Air Force to perform its basic mission.

I am not speaking of a far-fetched notion.

Under the Commission plan, every single military aircraft engine would be overhauled at a single place. Just a few years ago, that very building suffered a disastrous fire that shut it down for over a year. Luckily for the Air Force, the workload at Tinker Air Force Base could be diverted to the engine facility at Kelly Air Force Base, and readiness did not suffer.

But the Commission recommended that the logistics functions at Kelly be shut down—leaving the Air Force not only no reserve capacity to repair engines, and very little for aircraft in the event of any conflict lasting more than a few days; but depriving it of any ability to shift workload in the event a major facility is shut down by accident or some catastrophic misfortune.

The Air Force recommendation, supported by the Secretary of Defense, was to keep five Air Force logistics centers, but to reduce each of them in size, in effect, mothballing capacity that could rapidly be brought into action in the event of need. This would have saved money and provided a considerable margin of safety as well. But the Commission rejected the idea of maintaining such a margin of safety, even though the Air Force plan would have saved almost as much money as the Commission plan.

Not only did the Commission reject the idea of maintaining reserve capacity while saving money, it compounded this double error by electing to shut down Kelly Air Force Base, which is the cheapest and most reliable of the Air Logistics Centers. The work that is done at Kelly is of the highest quality, unsurpassed by any; and its cost per hour is the lowest in the service. How can it make sense to close down the lowest cost, highest quality producer? But this is what happened.

The President clearly does not want to lose the capacity that is available at Kelly Air Force Base, so he has opted to try privatizing the major facilities there, so as to keep them in being, and keeping at least some of the trained personnel in place. In other words, the Commission's basic premise is so flawed that it has been rejected, as a practical matter. But I do not believe we should accept a half-measure that on its face accepts the recommendation, but at the same time rejects its premise, which is where we stand today. I would rather reject the Commission report outright, and I urge that the House do so by supporting this resolution. Let us say frankly that we want reserve capacity; let us say honestly that we want flexibility and emergency response ability; and let us reject a report and recommendation that flies in the face of sound policy and even good sense. Vote for the resolution.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY].

(Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to oppose House Joint Resolution 102, a motion of disapproval, and ask my colleagues to vote no.

Mr. Speaker, I am a little hesitant about getting up here this morning, because I was fortunate that I had two bases on the Base Closure Commission list and those bases came off. But I want to point out to my colleagues, I have also in the past had units that were put on the Base Closure Commission that did not come off.

Mr. Speaker, it should be pointed out that the members of the 1995 Base Closure Commission represented a broad section of this country. The chairman was Alan Dixon, a former Member from Illinois, and, incidentally, he voted to close my bases. Then you had Mr. Al Cornella of South Dakota, a private businessman, and Ms. Rebecca Cox, who served on the Commission before private enterprise forced out our Air Force Gen. J.B. Davis, very qualified, Mr. Lee Kling, a banker from St. Louis, MO, private enterprise. You had Adm. Ben Montoya, who is very capable and who had been in the Navy.

□ 1030

And then you had Maj. Gen. Joe Robles who served as a base commander and knew a lot about base closure. And then you had Miss Wendi Steele who served on the staff here in Washington on the Senate side. So, Mr. Speaker, these were qualified people. I guess I spent more time at the Base Closure Commission meetings and I was impressed.

Now, the staff worked hard. They were highly qualified. Some had been on the board in previous base closure rounds. They knew the bases and the process. These men and women, as far as I know, this Commission spent more time on the job flying around the country. They went thousands and thousands of miles looking at the different bases. So the process was open from start to finish. You could talk to the commissioners, you could talk to staff.

Mr. Speaker, they made themselves available to all of us. It is the toughest job I think you could give civilians, and that is one reason I wanted to get up here this morning to commend these commissioners for taking on a job like this. There are no compliments to it. It was a heartache to them. They did not like what they had to do, but they served our country well. I think they did a very thorough and fair job, and I hope the House will reject the motion for disapproval and accept the recommendations of this Commission.

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BONILLA].

(Mr. BONILLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of a strong national defense, a vigilant America, and a secure, peaceful future. I support this

resolution, of which I am an original sponsor, to disapprove the misguided recommendations of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Closing vital military facilities, like Kelly Air Force Base, leaves America weaker. Ask my colleagues to put aside parochial interests and vote for a strong Armed Forces. Reject the BRAC proposals.

Ronald Reagan clearly understood the necessity of a policy of peace through strength. That policy brought us triumph in the cold war. In contrast, policies of unilateral disarmament in the past only served to embolden aggressors and set the stage for World War II. I am afraid these BRAC recommendations reflect a pattern of disarmament which threatens our future security.

Our military leaders and the Commander-in-Chief have recognized the serious negative implications of the BRAC recommendations for our military security. However, President Clinton failed to reject these dangerous proposals. I urge my colleagues to reject these proposals and please vote for a strong defense and for this resolution.

I would be remiss if I failed to note that the BRAC did get some things right. This BRAC recognized the importance and quality of Laughlin Air Force Base. Its facilities remain second to none and the BRAC Commissioners had no choice but to recognize that fact. Brooks Air Force Base's excellence was recognized as well. However, the recommendation to close Kelly remains irresponsible and dangerous.

I also want to take a moment to comment on the human dimension of this recommendation. The BRAC proposal will have a devastating impact on affected communities costing tens of thousands of jobs and hurting tens of thousands of families. Closing Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio will slam the door on thousands of hard working patriotic Americans. It will ignore their sacrifices. I know that the spirit and the dedication of the Kelly worker cannot be crushed and that ultimately San Antonio will overcome this setback. But our military will clearly be weakened and the lives of Kelly's workers will be disrupted and their financial security jeopardized. Please vote for this resolution and let Kelly's workers know we are in their corner.

If you support the visions of Ronald Reagan's peace through strength, if you support our U.S. Air Force, if you support the plan of preserving freedom and liberty going into the next century, please vote for this resolution.

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my friend, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague and friend and neighbor from San Antonio for yielding me time.

On June 16, 1995, 35,000 San Antonians lined the streets of our hometown to

demonstrate "Kelly Pride." The purpose of this huge demonstration in "Military City" was to inform the Base Realignment and Closure Commission why Kelly Air Force Base should not be closed. It wasn't only the people of San Antonio who recognized the importance of Kelly to defending the freedom that Americans cherish. Military leaders understood the importance of Kelly and recommended that BRAC not close Kelly. Because the BRAC Commission ignored this view and decided to close Kelly anyway, I support the Tejada resolution and will vote to disapprove the BRAC Commission list.

Our military leaders recommended that Kelly stay open for good reason. The pride of San Antonio has made Kelly into one of the Nation's premier Air Force bases, an essential player in the free world's fight against nazism, fascism, communism, and in the recently successful campaign in the Persian Gulf.

You can see the pride of San Antonio in the work of the generations of San Antonians who have made Kelly Air Logistics Center synonymous with high quality, top efficiency, and unmatched productivity.

You can see the pride of San Antonio as another C-5 or C-5A rolls out of one of the enormous hangers where it has been expertly serviced and prepared to do its part in our Nation's defense.

You can see the pride of San Antonio as its military and civilian communities rallied together to support airlifts in Operation Desert Storm and all recent major conflicts and humanitarian missions.

The Air Force recognized the indispensable contributions of Kelly and that is why they recommended that this depot remain open. Because BRAC rejected the recommendations of our military experts, I will vote for the motion to disapprove the recommendations of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission out of protest against the loss of resources and services that the Kelly community contributes to our Nation's defense.

Kelly's proud tradition is confirmed not only by the Air Force's recommendation that Kelly stay open but also by the decision of the Commission and the administration to recommend that "Privatization in place" be implemented at Kelly. I am encouraged and hopeful that this plan will secure our Nation's defense. Our community's leaders, the city of San Antonio, and the Kelly community will join together to work with the Federal Government to ensure that this transition is as smooth as possible.

I know that our community will show the hard work, patriotism, and commitment that it has always shown in its work for our Nation's military. I am optimistic that you will continue to see San Antonio's pride as future generations of workers demonstrate their excellence, as another C-5 rolls out of the hanger, and as we support the missions of our Nation's armed

services in future crises. "Kelly Pride" will sustain our community through this transition, just as thoroughly as it has sustained our Nation's Air Force for so many years.

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. PASTOR].

(Mr. PASTOR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PASTOR. Mr. Speaker, the Hispanic Caucus has been a very active participant throughout the BRAC process. Our concern has been the closure of Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio.

We have worked in a bipartisan manner with our colleagues from San Antonio in order to ensure that the economic viability of San Antonio continues. As you heard this morning, and studies have shown, on the merits Kelly Air Force Base deserves to continue its mission. It has been very effective. It has been efficient and plays a vital role in the defense of this country. So on the merits alone, Kelly Air Force Base deserves to continue its mission.

One of the concerns that we have as the Hispanic Caucus is that Kelly Air Force Base has been a long-time employer of the Hispanic community in San Antonio. To date, over 60 percent of the civilian employment base in Kelly is of Mexican-American descent. Kelly Air Force Base has had a long history in the Hispanic community. It has provided employment and in turn has provided opportunities for Hispanic families to better themselves.

If Kelly Air Force Base is closed according to the BRAC recommendation, it will have a devastating effect in the Hispanic community of San Antonio, high unemployment, lack of opportunity for families to better themselves.

Mr. Speaker, Kelly Air Force Base deserves to stay open, continue its mission on the merits, but it also needs to continue in order to ensure the well-being of San Antonians in Texas.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. KOLBE). The gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEJEDA] has 3 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO] has 4 minutes remaining.

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS].

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution of disapproval. The 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendations have missed the mark. This year's report uses that I believe to be faulty methodology, underestimated costs, and optimistic savings assumptions. As I have stated previously in writing to President Clinton, in light of the problems associated with this report, we should declare a moratorium on all base closures, pending a reexamination of the true savings associated with closing the specified bases.

Obviously, my primary frame of reference for this issue is in the State of

California. California has already lost 22 bases—more than any other State. If the current closings go into effect, the cumulative loss for California would total 200,000 jobs and \$7 billion in economic activity. Closing the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, in Long Beach, CA, as this report would do, is unnecessary, militarily risky, and it would exacerbate the deteriorating industrial base of our region of the country.

Without question, these recommendations are bad for California, but they are bad for the military as well. Many of the savings envisioned from this report are illusory. There is no guarantee we can save money and no real assurances that jobs lost can be replaced. Previous attempts to contract for lost jobs have been less than successful. In conclusion, let's start this process over and do it right. Let's support this resolution, and disapprove the Base Closing Commission report.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GEKAS].

(Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, the result of this year's round of BRAC decisions adversely affected my own district in Indiantown Gap, heretofore a vital part of our national defense structure, which has been modified downward, downsized, as it were, by the decision. You would think then that I would stand here and support with all my heart and vigor the resolution that is at hand, but I take the opposite view.

I supported the initial concept of BRAC and its initial coming into being and voted for it. It is unseemly now of me to say that, because it has affected perhaps adversely my own back yard, that the concept is wrong, that the decisionmaking was flawed, that the concept is inappropriate. I believe very strongly that the people in my district who were affected by this latest decision of the BRAC are going to be able to rally to the cause of softening the blow and of finding alternative ways of continuing the enterprises in which they were involved in support of some of the activities of the Indiantown Gap facility.

In short, they will be resilient enough to understand that we cannot have a nationwide concept of downsizing our bases across the Nation and across the world except for our own. Therefore, I will vote against this resolution.

□ 1045

Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I just want to simply sum up by saying a few things here. I think the gentleman from California [Mr. DOOLITTLE] said it correctly when he said BRAC was a political entity. It simply takes the politics out of Congress and perhaps out of the Pentagon, and puts it in the hands of a number of decent and perhaps well-intentioned

people, but people who do bring biases. We have seen this debate go on, as others have in the past, and those who dodge the BRAC bullet are here to praise the Commission, and those who were impacted by it are here to deride them.

The bottom line is, for California, as we have heard from many Members, we have had an overwhelming impact. Fourteen percent of all DOD personnel in our State, from 60 direct to 85 indirect percentage of all jobs lost through the 4 BRAC rounds in one State. There is no question, if we had moved across services and forced the military entities to compete with each other, we could have done a much better job of saving the taxpayers money and preserving the best of our infrastructure, but privatization is also important. We have heard people come to the floor today and deride privatization. Whether it is the Defense Science Board or the Joint Chiefs or the Commission on Roles and Missions, all of them are pushing us in the direction of privatization. The President pushes for it, the BRAC itself in its report allows it, and I call my colleagues to read the letter from the President to the Commission, from the Commission to the President, all of the legal authority in the view of all the various general counsel and all the agencies makes clear that privatization can take place at McClellan and Kelly Air Force Base, despite the critics, who would like to take our workload and would like to take our jobs to their own bases.

Let me be very clear. We will be dipping into readiness to pay for this foolish reduction in our capability. We will not be able to make the numbers work out. This BRAC round is predicated on phony bean counting, and in my view, we will pay for it, not only with turbulence in our military repair area, particularly for aircraft in the Air Force arsenal, but we will also pay for it by draining our readiness funds to pay for base closure, something that is supposed to save the taxpayers money.

Sacramento will survive. We will pull it together and we will come back, despite these heavy hits, but I do believe that my opposition and my support for this resolution is firmly based on the hit on American military readiness, so I would urge my colleagues to join us in perhaps what is a protest vote, but still a symbolic and important symbol of our opposition.

Mr. Speaker, I yield my remaining 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEJEDA].

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

(Mr. TEJEDA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank very much the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. HEFLEY], our chairman on the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on National Security, and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.

SPENCE], our full committee chairman, for their cooperation and understanding on this issue.

Mr. Speaker, Kelly has the best quality record with the lowest defect rate and the fewest customer complaints of all ALCs. Kelly has the best educated Air Force, and nowhere else in the Nation will we find employees who are as involved in their community than in San Antonio.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Base Closure Commission has cut right through the fat and into the bone and muscle of our Air Force. Keep in mind that California was essential to the success of Operation Just Cause and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 17 million pounds of munitions and 64 percent of items for airlift support were shipped through Kelly. The Air Force recommendation to the Commission on Depots was the product of a thorough, year-long study conducted by professional military analysts. The Base Closure Commission's recommendation on the ALCs followed only 6 weeks of study, during which time they were also attempting to focus on hundreds of other Air Force, Army, and Navy installations.

Mr. Speaker, this is the final opportunity to right the wrongs made by the Commission. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution of disapproval.

Mr. Speaker, I fully recognize that the post-cold-war drawdown of military infrastructure has lagged behind the personnel reductions. Nobody said that there would be easy choices in this round of base closures.

I feel strongly, however, that the Base Closure Commission overstepped its bounds and placed our military readiness at risk in the event of a national crisis. Never before in previous base closure rounds has a Commission deviated so substantially from the Defense Department's recommendations.

It should come as no surprise that my objection to this base closure list rests with the recommended closure of two Air Force logistics centers, or ALCs. Although Kelly AFB is not in my district, I do represent many of the outstanding and dedicated workers there and I recognize that the work they do is second to none in the Department of Defense.

In fact, Kelly has the best quality record, with the lowest defect rate and fewest customer complaints, of all ALCs. Kelly has the best educated work force, and nowhere else in the Nation will you find employees who are as involved in their community than in San Antonio.

In March, the Air Force and the Department of Defense proposed to the Base Closure Commission that the five existing ALCs downsize in place rather than close one of the depots. To reach this commonsense proposal, the Air Force focussed on being financially responsible, reducing excess capacity, and satisfying its current and projected needs.

In testimony before the Base Closure Commission, Secretary of the Air Force Widnall stated that the cost to close one Air Force depot would nearly equal the entire Air Force budget for the next 6 years for all of its 1995 closures and realignments. So what does the Commission do? It votes to close not only two

depots, but it votes to close the most cost-effective and productive depot at Kelly AFB.

The original Air Force recommendation of downsizing would have eliminated more than one depot equivalent worth of excess capacity without losing the many unique facilities and capabilities at any of the depots. In voting to close two, the Commission disregarded the value and cost-effectiveness of these unique facilities, particularly with respect to the C-5 at Kelly AFB.

There is only one depot in the Defense Department which can support the C-5. Kelly has the only hangar in the DOD which can hold six C-5s, and it is the only depot able to test and repair the C-5 engine. With 23 years of C-5 management and maintenance experience, Kelly is the heart of DOD strategic airlift.

During Commission hearings, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ron Fogleman stated:

It is clear that we have excess capacity. It is equally clear, in my view, that our approach reduces that capacity in the manner that best serves the total operational mission of the Air Force. I believe it is the only responsible approach to this issue.

The day before the Commission's vote on the ALCs, Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman wrote to Commission Chairman Alan Dixon. I will not read the letter, but I think it is significant and include it in the RECORD at this point of the debate.

The material referred to is as follows:

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE,
Washington, DC, June 21, 1995.

Hon. ALAN J. DIXON,
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 1700 N. Moore Street,
Suite 1425, Arlington, VA

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Air Force approach to the depots is prudent because it saves money for the taxpayers and protects military readiness. It is also the product of exhaustive analysis by military professionals and senior leadership who have been working the proposal for over a year.

Our depot proposal is simple. Building on the personnel reductions that have already been taken from the Air Logistic Centers and depots during the last five years (over 26,000 people), the pending air Force proposal would reduce and realign the depots by an additional 1,987 jobs (with a net present value of \$975 million). While there would be some disruption, the business of the Air Force—flying combat and transport aircraft, and maintaining our command and control and space network—would continue unimpeded. This total air Force depot reduction of 28,000 jobs is almost two and a half times the total depot reduction achieved by all other DoD components in all four BRAC rounds combined.

On the other hand, the staff generated BRAC proposal described to us will cost the Air Force hundreds of millions of additional dollars (in excess of \$1 billion in environmental and military construction costs) during the next five years; disrupt military readiness because of the total restructuring of the Air Force logistics and depot system; preclude the Air Force from carrying through on vital readiness and modernization programs; and have a devastating impact on as many as 25,000 DoD employees in Texas and California who would lose their jobs or have to relocate to other Air Force installations at great personal and public expense.

Most importantly, the essential business of the Air Force—operations, logistics, and budget dollars that are critical to future modernization—would be greatly disrupted. Since the end of the cold war, the Air Force

has reduced its budget by more than \$20 billion and reduced personnel by over 200,000 people. Some further reductions and savings are necessary; however, they must be taken in a way that permits the Air Force to continue to carry out its essential mission. The Department of Defense proposal does that; the Commission staff alternative does not.

Sincerely,

RONALD R. FOGLEMAN,
General, USAF Chief of Staff.
SHIELA E. WIDNALL,
Secretary of the Air Force.

Mr. Speaker, in essence, they warned that the staff-generated BRAC proposal to close ALC's would severely disrupt military readiness and the essential operations of the Air Force.

As I sat in the hearing room during the Commission's deliberations on the ALC's, I was stunned by the blatant agenda being advanced by the Commission's staff—to portray Kelly AFB in the worst possible light and provide for the closure of two ALC's.

Commissioner J.B. Davis, a retired Air Force general, acknowledged during the Commission's vote that the staff seemed to be focused on the excess capacity figures. He concurred with General Fogleman that some overcapacity helps. It is that overcapacity, surge capacity, that services need in times of a crisis. He stated: "Closing depots * * * can severely disrupt that service and the Air Force's wartime capability."

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Base Closure Commission has cut right through the fat and into the bone and muscle of our Air Force. Keep in mind that Kelly was essential to the success of operation just cause and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 17 million pounds of munitions and 64 percent of items for airlift support were shipped through Kelly.

The Air Force recommendation to the Commission on Depots was the product of a thorough year-long study conducted by professional military analysts. The Base Closure Commission's recommendations on the ALC's followed only 6 weeks of study, during which time they were also attempting to focus on hundreds of other Air Force, Army and Navy installations.

This is the final opportunity to right the wrongs made by the Commission. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution of disapproval.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remainder of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEJEDA] and the gentleman from California, [Mr. FAZIO] for the way in which they have conducted themselves during this debate. I have tremendous empathy for the fight they are engaged in over there. Heck, I have the same problem. I do not want to see Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center closed, either. I think it is a mistake to do that.

I have a little less empathy with the parade of people who have come up here who voted yesterday for an across-the-board cut in the Defense budget who are now crying because a base in their area is being affected. That seems a little disingenuous to me.

This is not an easy process. I think sometimes this process does make wrong decisions. I think some of these

decisions we will regret down the line when we have national emergencies. I know this is agonizing for communities across this country, and it is not easy for the various branches of the services who are going through this, and having to recommend closing things that we would really rather not, in many cases, because they do not think it makes good sense. I am very disappointed that the President of the United States injected Presidential politics into this process. I think that is very disappointing.

This is not a perfect process, but it is the only process we have to get at this. We had not closed a base in this country since the 1970's until this process started. Congress did not have the ability to close bases. There are some bases that we do need to close. I reject the idea that to vote against this resolution is to vote against a strong national defense. It is this administration that is driving the depth at which we have to cut back on defense in this country. It is the most anti-Defense administration, I think, in the last 50 years, and that is what is driving the deep cuts that we have to make.

With these deep cuts, we have to use every single Defense dollar we have the most effective way possible, so yes, we are having to give up some facilities that I wish we were not giving up. However, this is the process we have set up. This is the end of this round of base closure.

I would encourage my colleagues to vote against this resolution, support the Base Closure Commission, and let us now move on to solidifying what we have with our defense structure across this country, and make sure that we have a strong defense with what we have left.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Speaker, I am compelled to vote in support of the resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission [BRAC]. I approve of the BRAC process, but in my district the Army has taken action under BRAC 95 that simply does not make sense, and I cannot support it.

The Army, in its closure submittal to the BRAC, has proposed moving the 400 military and civilian personnel and equipment of the Army's Information Systems Software Development Center [ISSC] from leased space in Fairfax County to Government space on Fort Meade, MD. It is ostensibly an in-area move and personnel will be transferred to the new facility at Fort Meade without layoffs. With the pressure on the services to move out of leased space, it looks like a good move. But, this is a bad decision for the Army and the Government, and though I have urged the Army and the BRAC to reconsider this decision, today we still find this facility slated for transfer in this BRAC recommendation.

The Army ISSC has been in Fairfax County for over 20 years. When the Army looked to move ISSC from outdated leased facilities in Fairfax, VA, it asked the General Services Administration [GSA] to rent space for ISSC in northern Virginia. The Army even specified the boundaries of an area in which they wanted to rent—a location close to its Fort Belvoir and

Pentagon customers and close to where most of its employees had settled over the past 20 years. This was the Crown Ridge building located at the junction of I-66 and the Fairfax County Parkway in my district.

GSA, at the request of the Army, signed a lease with Crown Ridge Associates for 6 years. That lease started a little over a year ago and runs through May 28, 2000. A total of \$7.2 million was spent by Crown Ridge, GSA, and the Army to upgrade the building to meet the unique requirements of Army ISSC. Crown spent \$1.3 million, GSA \$2.9 million, and DOD spent \$3.0 million to get this building ready. And in fact, they are still in the process of upgrading and moving into the space.

After spending all this money, the Army proposed in this BRAC to move ISSC to Fort Meade, MD. The Army believes that it will save \$8 million over 20 years. Under the Army lease with GSA, it can move out of the space without penalty if appropriate notice is given.

Unfortunately for GSA and the American taxpayer, GSA is still obligated for the 6-year term of the lease. If the Army moves out, GSA is stuck with an empty building. Not only that, but this will not be an easy space for the GSA to find government customers for. Traditionally, GSA would look for locations in some proximity to mass transit—the subway, trains, and bus lines. This location is well beyond the subway and there are no easy connections to mass transit. To quote GSA regarding Army plans to move out of this building,

... the building was leased specifically for the Army, and was altered to suit their specific needs. Other federal agencies have not expressed interest in the location, and the building might be difficult to market.

In addition, the Army is going to have to convert or build facilities at Fort Meade. The Cobra model figures used by the Army indicate that it will have to spend roughly \$5 million to renovate space at Fort Meade and moves ISSC. So, at a minimum, the Government spends \$11 million in renovation and moving costs and ISSC has to go through two moves in 3 years. But, the Government also will be stuck with a \$3 million per year lease for a building which may sit empty for 3 years—another \$9 million.

This is not how Congress intended the BRAC process to work—the objective is to reduce costs for the Government, not just the military services. Clearly, the Army should have made this move before it asked GSA to sign a 6-year lease. Now, however, the lease has been signed, and the Government is on the hook even if the Army moves out. I understand the pressure on the Army to move out of leased space, but this is a bad deal for the Government and the American taxpayer.

For this reason, I cannot support the BRAC recommendations.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 102, to disapprove the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

It is with great reluctance that I oppose the resolution of disapproval. I do so despite the fact that the Commission accepted a flawed Army recommendation to close the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant in my district.

In my judgment, the Army mishandled this matter. All other issues aside, the most fundamental shortcoming of the Army's recommendation is the lack of a credible estimate of the cost of closing the tank plant.

The Army's original claim was that closing the tank plant would result in a one-time cost of only \$1.4 million. When I asked the Army how it arrived at this figure, the Army told me the estimate was based on a standard formula that sets building closing costs at \$1.25 per square foot.

A buck and a quarter per square foot isn't going to do the job. Unlike most Army installations, the Detroit Tank Plant is an industrial facility that has been manufacturing tanks for nearly 50 years. I sincerely doubt \$1.4 million will be enough to close the facility and move the work to other locations.

During her site visit to the tank plant last April, Commissioner Steele heard a broad range of testimony from myself and others that raised serious problems with the Army's original closing cost estimate. After hearing the evidence, Commissioner Steele asked the Army to prepare a revised cost estimate by mid-May.

The Army never presented a revised cost estimate. The Army's Tank Automotive and Armaments Command [TACOM] in Warren, MI, requested and received detailed closing cost data from the contractor at the plant. Using this data, TACOM prepared a revised closing cost estimate. At the 11th hour, I was informed that the Army rejected the new cost study and decided to stick with its original estimate of \$1.4 million.

While the Army was unwilling to accept new cost data from the people who actually run the plant, my office received reports that the true closing costs, as calculated by the contractor at the plant and TACOM, are at least 25 times higher than the Army's original calculations.

It is being increasingly suggested that the Army desires to transfer the tank plant's work from the private sector to the Government-run Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois. This would be contrary to OMB circular No. A-76, which states that it is the official policy of United States that "the Government should not compete with its citizens." It also would be contrary to the recent recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. These jobs should remain in the private sector and in Michigan.

So why am I opposing the resolution to disapprove the base closure list? I do so for the simple reason that the Nation cannot afford to spend billions of dollars every year for unneeded defense installations around the country. At the end of the day, the independent base closure process is the only means we have to close unneeded military facilities.

The base closure process is painful. The process sometimes results in the wrong military facilities being closed, as the closure of the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant demonstrates. The one virtue of the base closure process is that it is unbiased and immune from politics. At the end of the day, it's about as fair a process as we're going to get.

I did everything I could to save the tank plant; however, I largely agree with the balance of the Base Closure Commissions recommendations to close or realign 103 other bases and military facilities. Closing these bases is expected to save more than \$19 billion over 20 years. I will therefore oppose the resolution of disapproval.

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I support the resolution of disapproval. I must do this because I am deeply disturbed by the base closure process. In the rush to close installations there

has been a failure to analyze all of the facts carefully. This is obvious in the recommendations made by the Commission concerning the Savanna Army Depot Activity and the O'Hare Reserve Station.

In the case of the Savanna Army Depot Activity, the Commission ignored a number of important factors. For example, closing the installation would result in the loss of important and hard-to-replicate capabilities, increase costs above the Army estimate to close the base and move its functions, and reduce ammo storage capability below critical military needs.

For instance, the Commission failed to consider that Savanna is one of the most efficient facilities in the Army. During Desert Storm, Savanna had the highest outloading rate of any depot. It is also one of the few with adequate rail service to shipping centers. These national assets would be hard to replace in a nationwide mobilization.

In addition, the estimate of the cost of closing Savanna and relocating the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School [USADACS] is too low. DOD stated that it would cost \$38 million to close the installation and relocate functions. However, the Savanna Army Depot Realignment Task Force estimates that the cost of closing the facility and moving the school is much higher—as much as \$88 million. This includes new construction that will have to take place at McAlester to complete the move.

Even more importantly, the decision to close ammunition storage facilities failed to take into account storage needs. The Army's 1993 Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Program study indicated that even with 11 depots, as much as 6 million square feet of outside storage will be needed to match our Nation's future ammunition stockpile. This could indicate that the ammunition study is flawed. Because of this decision, we may not have enough space to meet future storage needs.

Our ammunition depots are a national asset that will be needed to meet future mobilization needs. The Commission's recommendation will mean the loss of an important part of this irreplaceable asset.

Regarding the Commission's recommendation on the O'Hare Air Reserve Station, I am deeply disappointed that the Commission chose a course of action that will eliminate an entire unit within the State and also move the remaining KC135 unit to Scott AFB. The latter recommendation was made without an analysis of the costs to the Government or how long it will take the units to return to operational status.

The closure of the station and its C-130 unit would be a blow to Illinois and a sad chapter in one of our Nation's finest military units. The 928th Airlift Wing has one of the most distinguished records of any Reserve unit in the country. A highlight of this is the 46 years and over 166,000 hours of flying without an accident, the longest stretch of accident-free flying by any civilian or military organization in the country. We should preserve this record and keep the unit in one of the communities in Illinois willing to host it. Unfortunately, the Commission's recommendation will eliminate this effective and efficient fighting asset.

I am also disappointed that the Commission decided to change last year's recommendation concerning moving the 126th Air Refueling Wing. Instead of allowing the process to fully

progress, the Commission arbitrarily chose to relocate the unit to Scott Air Force Base. This move was done without any analysis of how long it would take the unit to reach full operational capability due to recruiting and retention concerns. Without this analysis, this recommendation is shortsighted and did not include a thoughtful consideration of other potential sites in the State of Illinois. I therefore cannot support this recommendation.

I believe that we should reject the recommendations of the Commission. From the errors I have seen made in just these two examples, I am concerned that other mistakes may have been made that will force us to make poor choices concerning our Nation's defense infrastructure and unnecessarily eliminate the jobs of thousands of civilian employees who have served our Nation proudly. I hope my colleagues will join me in opposing these recommendations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired. Pursuant to section 2908 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the question is on passage of the joint resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the yeas appeared to have it.

Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the grounds that a quorum is not present and I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant of Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 75, nays 343, not voting 16, as follows:

[Roll No. 647]

YEAS—75

Ackerman	Gejdenson	Miller (CA)
Andrews	Gephart	Mineta
Bentsen	Gilchrest	Murtha
Bevill	Gonzalez	Myers
Bonilla	Goodling	Ortiz
Borski	Green	Pastor
Browder	Hamilton	Payne (NJ)
Brown (CA)	Hastings (FL)	Pelosi
Bryant (TX)	Herger	Pombo
Chapman	Hilliard	Roybal-Allard
Clay	Holden	Royce
Coleman	Horn	Scarborough
Combest	Hoyer	Schroeder
Costello	Jackson-Lee	Seastrand
Davis	Kennelly	Shuster
de la Garza	Kim	Smith (TX)
DeLauro	Lantos	Talent
Dixon	Lewis (CA)	Tejeda
Doolittle	Lofgren	Torres
Eshoo	Manzullo	Torricelli
Evans	Martinez	Towns
Farr	Matsui	Waters
Fazio	McCollum	Williams
Ford	Menendez	Woolsey
Fox	Mica	Wynn

NAYS—343

Abercrombie	Bass	Brown (FL)
Allard	Bateman	Brown (OH)
Archer	Beilenson	Brownback
Armey	Bereuter	Bryant (TN)
Bachus	Berman	Bunn
Baessler	Bilbray	Bunning
Baker (CA)	Bilirakis	Burr
Baker (LA)	Bishop	Burton
Baldacci	Bliley	Buyer
Ballenger	Blute	Callahan
Barcia	Boehlert	Calvert
Barr	Boehner	Camp
Barrett (NE)	Bonior	Canady
Barrett (WI)	Bono	Cardin
Bartlett	Boucher	Castle
Barton	Brewster	Chabot

Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clayton
Clement
Clinger
Coble
Clyburn
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Cooley
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Creameans
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Deal
DeFazio
DeLay
Dellums
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Doggett
Dooley
Dornan
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fattah
Fawell
Fields (LA)
Fields (TX)
Filner
Flake
Flanagan
Foglietta
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Frost
Funderburk
Furse
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gibbons
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hefner
Heineman
Hilleary
Hinchey
Hobson

Hoekstra
Hoke
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Ingليس
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
King
Kingston
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaFalce
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Lincoln
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lowey
Lucas
Luther
Manton
Markey
Martini
Mascara
McCarthy
McCrery
McDermott
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Metcalf
Meyers
Mfume
Miller (FL)
Minge
Mink
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Myrick
Nadler
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Orton
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Payne (VA)
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pomeroy

Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Reed
Regula
Richardson
Riggs
Rivers
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Roth
Roukema
Rush
Sabo
Salmon
Sanders
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Schumer
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stockman
Studds
Stump
Stupak
Tanner
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thompson
Thornberry
Thornton
Thurman
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Traficant
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Ward
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Wyden
Yates
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NOT VOTING—16

Becerra
Dingell
Jefferson
Maloney
McDade
McKinney
Moakley
Moran
Morella
Paxon
Reynolds
Sisisky
Stenholm
Stokes
Tucker
Waldholtz

□ 1122

Messrs. OWENS, MCINTOSH, FIELDS of Louisiana, KENNEDY of Massachusetts, and Mrs. CHENOWETH changed their vote from "yea" to "nay."

Messrs. TORRICELLI, ROYCE, and GILCHREST changed their vote from "nay" to "yea."

So the joint resolution was rejected. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

REMOVAL OF NAME OF MEMBER AS COSPONSOR OF H.R. 1617

Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that my name be withdrawn as a cosponsor of H.R. 1617.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. DREIER). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 2020, TREASURY, POSTAL SERVICE, AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2020) making appropriations for the Treasury Department, the United States Postal Service, the Executive Office of the President, and certain independent agencies, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996, and for other purposes, with Senate amendments thereto, disagree to the amendments and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection.

MOTION TO INSTRUCT CONFEREES OFFERED BY MR. OBEY

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct conferees.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. OBEY moves that the managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the bill, H.R. 2020, be instructed to agree to the amendment of the Senate numbered 130.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. LIGHTFOOT] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] will be recognized for 30 minutes.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, am I correct that under the rules, a Member in

opposition has the right to half the time?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. One-third of the time could be allotted to a Member in opposition.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, is it my understanding that the gentleman is yielding to me the time?

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Mr. Speaker, I would be happy to yield my 30 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the motion?

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Mr. Speaker, I am not in favor of the motion, but I would yield my 30 minutes to the gentleman.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is yielding all 30 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland. The gentleman from Maryland is recognized for 30 minutes in opposition to the motion.

The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, what is before us is the question of going to conference on the Treasury-Postal appropriation bill. The motion that I have just made is a motion which would accept the Senate amendment numbered 130, which in essence indicates that the congressional pay will be frozen for yet another year with no COLA, although that COLA will be provided for other Federal employees.

Mr. Speaker, as Members of the House know, this House established a new procedure. As Members will remember in, I believe, 1991, the Congress took a step forward, at least I think many thoughtful Members will recognize it was a step forward, when we decided that outside income for Members of Congress was going to be limited and that instead we would have only one paymaster, that being the general public, rather than supplementing our pay through various activities, including giving speeches and earning outside income in a manner which many people were concerned created the appearance of a conflict of interest.

The Congress took a lot of heat for that action at the time, but I think it was the right action because I think it substantially improved the financial practices around here. It was supported on both sides of the aisle on a bipartisan basis.

We established a new process under that legislation which guaranteed that Members of Congress would never get a pay increase larger than that provided for other Federal employees. And, in fact, the way it was set up, we got that adjustment one year later, so that we could not be accused of setting the trend for increased pay, but rather we were following what would happen in other sectors of the economy.

Mr. Speaker, under that we received two small cost of living adjustments: A 3.5 increase in 1992 and a 3.2 increase in 1993. Since that time we have taken action each year to freeze our own pay. So that means that for calendar year